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BEHIND THE MUSIC: DETERMINING THE
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR
STATUTORY DAMAGES IN COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS
Colin Morrissey*
Record labels have brought thousands of copyright infringement lawsuits
against individuals engaged in the online downloading and distribution of
music. As these lawsuits work their way through the court system, a debate
has emerged over the constitutionality of the large statutory damage
awards some juries have awarded. In arguing that the copyright statute
results in unconstitutional damage awards, commentators as well as
defendants accused of copyright infringement contend that courts should
apply the rigorous standard of review for punitive damages that the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted in BMW of North America v. Gore to find large
statutory damage awards unconstitutional. But the record labels and
numerous commentators maintain that Gore has no place in the review of
statutory damages. They instead argue that the deferential review the
Court outlined in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v.
Williams is the proper standard, and that under this standard, statutory
damage awards are constitutional. This Note seeks to resolve the conflict
over the proper standardof constitutional review for statutory damages in
copyright infringement lawsuits. It concludes that courts should apply the
Williams standard to statutory damages because of the substantial
differences between statutory and punitive awards, but they should apply it
more rigorously than in the past to ensure that all statutory damage awards
for copyright infringement satisfy due process.
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INTRODUCTION
The invention of Napster in 1999 and the Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
downloading services that spawned in its wake have led to rampant digital
copyright infringement. At its peak, Napster had around twenty-six million
users worldwide. 1 Had it not been ordered to remove copyrighted content
from its system, the company estimated it would have had seventy-five
million users by the end of the year. 2 While it is difficult to measure
exactly how many people currently use P2P networks, almost all studies say
usage continues to grow. 3 In an effort to curb this widespread infringement,
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), a trade group that
represents the recording industry, has targeted the individuals who use these
services with copyright infringement lawsuits. 4 Since 2003, the major
record labels 5 have filed nearly 35,000 lawsuits accusing individuals of
downloading and distributing music in violation of their copyrights. 6 But
by the end of 2009, only two of these suits had been tried before a jury.
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas 7 was first tried in 2007 and resulted in a
$222,000 verdict for the plaintiff record labels for the infringement of
twenty-four songs. 8 A new trial was required due to a faulty jury
instruction, 9 and in June 2009 a second jury found Thomas-Rasset guilty of
copyright infringement and found her liable for a $1.92 million statutory
1. See Napster Use Slumps 65%, BBC NEWS, July 20, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/1449127.stm.
2. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff'd inpart,rev'd inpart,239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
3. ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., RIAA v. THE PEOPLE:

FIVE YEARS LATER 9 (2008),

availableat http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf.
4. See discussion infra Part I.B.

5. At the time the campaign began, the major record labels were Universal Music
Group, Warner Music Group, EMI Group, Sony Music, and BMG Music. See Jeff Leeds,
EU Said To Back Label Deal, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at C1. Sony then merged with

BMG, creating Sony BMG, before eventually buying it out, leaving just Sony Music
Entertainment. See Ethan Smith, Sony To Take Over Music Partnership, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 2008, at B 1.
6. See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry To Abandon Mass Suits, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at B 1.
7. No. 06-cv-1497 (D. Minn. filed Apr. 19, 2006). The name on the court docket was

later changed from Thomas to Thomas-Rasset. See Civil Motion Hearing at 1, Capitol

Records Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-cv-14 9 7 (D. Minn. May 20, 2009).
8. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008).

9. Id. at 1228.
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damage award.10 The second suit to be tried was Sony BMG Music
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum) 1
Like Jamie Thomas-Rasset, Joel
Tenenbaum was found guilty of copyright infringement, and the jury
awarded the record labels $22,500 per song for thirty songs for a judgment
totaling $675,000.12
The size of the verdicts in these cases, especially the second ThomasRasset trial, was surprising even to music industry executives and
musicians. 13 These large awards have reignited a debate both inside and
outside the courtroom over the constitutionality of statutory damages for
copyright infringement. 14 Many commentators and defendants in copyright
infringement suits believe that large statutory damage awards are
unconstitutional. 15 This argument generally relies on the premise that there
are similarities between statutory and punitive damages that require courts
to apply the U.S. Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence,
specifically the three "guideposts" laid out in BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore,16 to statutory damage awards. 17 The theory is that because Gore
10. Memorandum of Law & Order at 5, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06cv-1497 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2010). This award was then remitted, id. at 2, and declined by
the plaintiffs, who instead opted for a third trial on damages. Notice of Plaintiffs' Decision
RE: Remittitur at 6, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 06-cv-1497 (D. Minn. Feb. 8,
2010).
11. No. 07cv11446-NG, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); see
also Denise Lavoie, Jury Awards $675K in Boston Music Downloading Case, ABC NEWS,
Aug. 2, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=8232281 (noting that Sony
BMG Music Entertainmentv. Tenenbaum was the second RIAA lawsuit to go to trial).
12. See Judgment at 1, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cv1 1446-NG (D.
Mass. Dec. 7, 2009) (entering judgment for plaintiff).
13. Copyrights
&
Campaigns,
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/
2009/06/sony-bmg-attomey-we-were-shocked-by.html (June 20, 2009, 14:46 EST) (noting
an executive at Sony said, "We were shocked," about the verdict); Daniel Kreps, Richard
Marx "'Ashamed" He's Linked to $1.92 Million RIAA Fine Against Minnesota Mom,
ROLLING STONE:

ROCK & ROLL DAILY, June 24, 2009, http://www.rollingstone.com/

rockdaily/index.php/2009/06/24/richard-marx-ashamed-hes-linked-to- 192-million-riaa-fineagainst-minnesota-mom (discussing the opinion of Richard Marx, whose songs ThomasRasset distributed); Posting of Moby to Moby.com, http://www.moby.com/joumal/2009-0620/riaa-have-sued-jammie-thomas-rasset-minn.html (June 20, 2009) (calling the nearly two
million dollar verdict "utter nonsense").
14. The applicability of the U.S. Supreme Court's punitive damage jurisprudence to the
review of statutory damages has already been discussed prior to these two cases. See
generally Blaine Evanson, Note, Due Process in Statutory Damages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 601 (2005). These recent verdicts have significantly heated up the debate, specifically
in the context of statutory damage awards for copyright infringement. See, e.g., Pamela
Samuelson & Ben Sheffher, Debate, UnconstitutionallyExcessive Statutory DamageAwards
in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNuMBRA 53 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/
debates/pdfs/CopyrightDamages.pdf (debating the constitutionality of statutory damage
awards for copyright infringement).
15. See, e.g., Motion for a New Trial, Remittitur, and to Alter or Amend the Judgment at
2, 4-5, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-cv-1497 (D. Minn. July 6, 2009)
[hereinafter Thomas-Rasset Motion for a New Trial] (arguing that the "shocking" and
"grossly excessive" verdict was "inconsistent with the Due Process Clause").
16. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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mandates an exacting review of damage awards, 18 large judgments like
those in the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum cases fail the Gore test. But
the record labels, in addition to numerous commentators, argue that
damages awarded under copyright's statutory damage provision are
constitutional. 19 They contend that there are substantial differences
between punitive and statutory damages, so the Court's standard of review
for statutory damages outlined in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern
Railway Co. v. Williams 20 should control. 2 1 Since Williams is more
deferential than Gore,22 proponents of applying the Williams standard to
statutory damage awards maintain that they easily pass this test.
As there are a number of lawsuits against P2P network users still in the
pipeline, now is an extremely important moment in this debate over the
constitutionality of statutory damages. However, as a threshold issue, both
sides must be on the same playing field. Since Williams is a deferential
standard and Gore is more rigorous, the standard used for review has a
substantial impact on the outcome of this constitutional question. This Note
seeks to determine the proper standard of constitutional review for statutory
damages for copyright infringement and explore the issue of their
constitutionality by examining the opinions of courts and commentators, as
well as arguments asserted by parties involved in copyright infringement
suits.
Part I provides some background on the types of damages discussed in
this Note and traces the basic history of copyright damages through the
most recent revision of the damage provision in 1999. Part I concludes by
detailing the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum cases and discussing the
relevant constitutional standards for statutory and punitive damages as
outlined in Williams and Gore respectively. Then, Part II highlights the due
process concerns and similar purpose statutory and punitive damages share
to outline the argument for Gore's application in a statutory damages
context. Part II discusses the argument for why the Gore guideposts have
no application, focusing on the differences between the two awards, the
importance of deference to the decisions of the legislature, and the difficulty
in applying the Gore guideposts to statutory damage awards. Finally, Part
III advocates for the use of the Williams standard instead of Gore when a
court reviews a statutory damage award for copyright infringement and
argues that the review under Williams should be more rigorous.

18. See infra Part I.C.1.
19. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial,
Remittitur, and to Alter or Amend the Judgment at 7, Capitol Records Inc. v. ThomasRasset, No. 06-cv-1497 (D. Minn. Aug. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Opposition to Thomas-Rasset
Motion] (calling Thomas-Rasset's constitutional argument "baseless").
20. 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
21. See discussion infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part I.C.2.
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I. LEAD UP TO LITIGATION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTORY
DAMAGE PROVISION, THE RIAA's LAWSUITS, AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

This part discusses the important elements of the debate over the
constitutionality of statutory damages for copyright infringement in order to
lend context to the arguments that follow. First this part explores the types
of damages relevant to this conflict and the purposes they serve, focusing
mainly on statutory damages. Next, this part discusses the RIAA's
copyright infringement lawsuits, specifically Thomas-Rasset and
Tenenbaum and the resulting statutory damage awards in order to provide
an understanding of what sparked this debate. Finally, this part outlines the
two different constitutional standards, namely Gore and Williams, that
courts, commentators, and parties in copyright infringement suits have
argued are applicable in the review of statutory damage awards.
A. Damagesfor Copyright Infringement
This section discusses the types of damages involved in this conflict,
with a strong focus on statutory damages. First, Part I.A. 1 details the
differences between punitive, actual, and statutory damages. Next, Part
I.A.2 explores the development of copyright infringement damages since
the first federal Copyright Act in 1790. Finally, Part I.A.3 focuses on the
current damage provision and the purposes it is designed to serve, and Part
I.A.4 covers the most recent adjustment to the statutory range.
1. Actual, Statutory, and Punitive Damages
This Note discusses three unique types of damage awards: actual,
statutory, and punitive damages. Under current copyright law, both actual
and statutory damages are authorized remedies. 23 Actual damages, also
known as compensatory damages, are the standard measure of providing
redress for injuries caused by a wrongdoer. 24 In the context of copyright
law, the owner of a copyright receives "the actual damages suffered by him
or her as a result of the infringement. '25 These actual damages are
calculated by determining "the value of the uses [of the copyrighted work]
that would have been had if the defendant had not infringed the
copyright. '26 Additionally, a plaintiff who recovers actual damages is
entitled to receive any of the infringer's profits related to the
27
infringement.

23. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER

ON COPYRIGHT § 14.01[B] (2009).
24. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 25 (2003).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
26. TERENCE P. Ross, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND REMEDIES
§ 2.0211] (2009).
27. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 14.03; Ross, supra note 26, § 2.02[2].
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The Copyright Act also contains a statutory damage provision. 28
Statutory damages are awarded between a maximum and minimum amount
that is set by a legislative body in a statute. 29 Under copyright law,
statutory damages allow a copyright owner to recover between $750 and
$30,000 per infringed work, with special exceptions for innocent
infringement and willful infringement. 30 Statutory damages are recovered
instead of actual damages and are generally unrelated to the harm suffered
by a copyright owner. 31 The following sections discuss in greater detail the
development of the current copyright damage provision, the purposes
statutory damages are designed to serve, and the Supreme Court's
32
jurisprudence governing their constitutionality.
Unlike actual and statutory damages, punitive damages are not intended
to compensate the plaintiff for his injury. 33 Instead, the jury awards
punitive damages in addition to actual damages to punish the defendant for
wrongful acts that were "intentionally or maliciously done." 34 The purpose
of these damages is simple-to deter the defendant and others from future
wrongful conduct and to exact punishment for the offense committed. 35 As
will be discussed in Part I.C.1, the size and constitutionality of a punitive
damage award is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Gore.
Though punitive damages are not awarded in copyright infringement
lawsuits, 36 their relevance to this debate stems from the argument that
statutory damages are similar to punitive damages, and thus should be
37
reviewed under the constitutional standard for punitive damages.

28. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
29. Ross, supra note 26, § 2.02[3]; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23,
§ 14.04[A].
30. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2).
31. ROSS, supra note 26, § 2.02[3]; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23,
§ 14.04[A] (noting that a copyright owner can elect to recover statutory damages "regardless
of the adequacy of the evidence" of the actual damage suffered, or even if no evidence of
actual damages is offered).
32. See infra Part I.A.2-4, C.2.
33. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages, supra note 24, §§ 24, 25, 539; see also I LINDA L.
SCHLUETER, PUNITIvE DAMAGES 29 (5th ed. 2005).
34. See 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 33, at 29.
35. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (noting
that punitive damages "are aimed at deterrence and retribution" (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991))); see also I
SCHLUETER, supra note 33, at 29-31.
36. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 14.02(c)(2); see also Hays v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 847 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding punitive damages are not available in
copyright suits); Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Blair v. World
Tropics Prods., 502 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 (W.D. Ark. 2007) (same); Curcio Webb LLC, v.
Nat'l Benefit Programs Agency, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1198 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (same).
37. See infra Part II.A.
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2. Legislative History of Copyright's Damage Provision

The previous section discussed three types of damage awards.

The

remainder of Part L.A focuses only on the remedies available under

copyright's damage provision-statutory and actual damages. Statutory
damages for copyright infringement have existed since England codified the
world's first copyright statute in 1710.38

The Statute of Anne, also titled

"An Act for the Encouragement of Learning," granted authors the exclusive
right to control their works. 39 The Act featured a statutory damage
provision that required an infringer to pay one penny per infringing sheet,
half of which went to the author and the other half to the Crown. 40 The Act

awarded statutory damages to compensate the copyright owner and deter
future infringement. 4 1

As discussed throughout the remainder of this

section, from the first federal copyright statute through the most recent
revision of copyright law in 1999, this has consistently been the rationale
for allowing the recovery of statutory damages for copyright infringement.
U.S. copyright law traces its roots back to a period before the formation
of the federal government. 42 Upon the recommendation of the Continental

Congress that all states pass acts granting authors and printers protection for
44
their works, 4 3 every state except for Delaware passed a copyright statute.
Even though all these statutes were in large part modeled after the Statute of
Anne, their damage provisions varied quite dramatically, and featured both
actual and statutory damages. 45 Seven of twelve states required an
infringing party to pay an award based on the value of the damage he
caused to the copyright holder4 6 while the other five statutes included either
47
a maximum and minimum award or a fixed, per-copy amount.

38. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); see also Priscilla Ferch, Note, Statutory
Damages Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485, 487 (1984) (discussing
the damages provision of the Statute of Anne).
39. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.); see also RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN
OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 6-7 (1925) (detailing the rights granted by the Statute of
Anne); 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (1994) (same).
40. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.); see also Ferch, supra note 38, at
487 (discussing the damages provision of the Statute of Anne).
41. See Ferch, supra note 38, at 487-88.
42. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 350 (1998) (tracing
the early history of copyright law).
43. THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906,
at 11 (2d ed. 1906); see also 1 PATRY, supra note 39, at 19.
44. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 350; Maurice J. Holland, A Brief History of American
Copyright Law, in THE COPYRIGHT DILEMMA 3, 10 (Herbert S. White ed., 1978). See
generally SOLBERG, supra note 43, at 11-30 (listing all the state statutes).
45. See COPYRIGHT: CURRENT VIEWPOINTS ON HISTORY, LAWS, LEGISLATION 2 (Allen
Kent & Harold Lancour eds., R.R. Bowker Co. 1972) (1972) (noting the early state
copyright statutes were similar to British law); WILLIAM S. STRAUSS, STUDY No. 22: THE
DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (1956), reprintedin 2 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman ed., 1976) (detailing the damage
provisions of early state copyright statutes).
46. See STRAUSS, supra note 45, at I (noting that the Georgia and New York statutes
required the payment of "justdamages," the New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
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Unlike state copyright law, the first federal copyright statute only
allowed recovery of statutory damages. 48 Under the authorization of
Article I of the Constitution, 49 Congress created the first federal copyright
statute in 1790.50 The Act borrowed extensively from the Statute of Anne,
even more so than the state copyright statutes, to the extent that "[i]f the
Statute of Anne had been under copyright, its copyright would have been
infringed by the first American copyright statute." 5 1 Congress adopted a

damage provision authorizing a statutory damage award of fifty cents for
every infringing sheet, with half going to the copyright holder and half
going to the federal government. 52 And just like the Statute of Anne, this
damage scheme was designed to serve the dual purposes of providing
compensation for the copyright owner when actual damages were hard 5to3

prove and penalizing the copyright infringer to deter infringement.

Though subsequent amendments to copyright law changed the type of work
54
covered, the term of protection, and the amount of the statutory award,
this same basic damage provision stayed in place for over one hundred

years. 55

Virginia statutes required the payment of "double the value of all the copies," and the
Connecticut statute featured both).
47. See id. (noting that the Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island copyright
statutes all set a minimum and maximum damage award and that Maryland and South
Carolina copyright statutes set a fixed amount for each infringing copy).
48. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1947); Pamela
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439,446-47 (2009).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
50. Act of May 31, 1790 § 2, 1 Stat. at 124; see also Ferch, supra note 38, at 485.
51. Holland, supra note 44, at 11. Compare Act of May 31, 1790 ("An Act for the
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors
and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned."), with Statute of Anne,
1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) ("An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting the
Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasors of such Copies during the Times
therein mentioned.").
52. See Act of May 31, 1790 § 2, 1 Stat. at 124; see also Ferch, supra note 38, at 488-89.
53. See Ferch, supra note 38, at 489; Steven M. Tepp, The Constitutional Challenge to
Statutory Damagesfor Copyright Infringment: Don't Gore Section 504, ENGAGE, July 2009,
at 93, 93, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090720_TeppEngage102.pdf
(proclaiming it "noteworthy" that early statutory damages had a "hybrid purpose").
54. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, § 1, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (repealed 1947)
(adding dramatic works to copyrightable subject matter, granting their creators the fight of
public performance, and setting the award for the unauthorized performance of a public work
at one hundred dollars for the first performance and fifty dollars for each subsequent
performance); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 7, 4 Stat. 436, 438 (repealed 1947) (adding
musical works to copyrightable subject matter, extending the initial term of protection to
twenty-eight years, and increasing the award for maps, charts, musical compositions, cuts,
and engravings to one dollar); Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 3, 2 Stat. 171, 172 (repealed
1947) (setting the award for prints at one dollar per print).
55. See Tepp, supra note 53, at 93 (noting that Congress first changed the form of the
statutory damages provision in 1895).
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The Copyright Act of 1895 added a number of new works to the scope of
copyrightable subject matter and introduced two new concepts to the
calculation of statutory damages under federal copyright law. 56 First, and
most importantly, Congress created statutory ranges featuring maximum
and minimum awards, instead of a set penalty, to calculate damages for the
infringement of any of the newly added works. 57 Second, the Act changed
the way damage awards were calculated, awarding statutory damages for
the new works per each infringed work, rather than per infringement. 58
These changes represented the first major step towards the damage
provision as we know it today.5 9
At the urging of the Register of Copyrights and President Theodore
Roosevelt, Congress began a major revision of copyright law in 1905.60
After years of conferences, studies, and hearings, the Copyright Act of 1909
was enacted. 6 1 The Act made numerous changes to the statute's damage
provision by continuing the trends that began with the 1895 Act. 62 First,
the 1909 Act allowed a copyright holder to recover actual damages for the
first time under federal copyright law. 63 When a copyright owner's work
was infringed, he could recover either the actual damages suffered and the
defendant's profits, or a statutory damage award. 64 The decision regarding
which type of damages should be awarded belonged to the court, and
statutory damages were generally only awarded when the evidence of the
actual damage suffered was scarce. 6 5 Congress also expanded the use of
the statutory range as a device for calculating damages. 66 The Act treated
the set amounts awarded previously as guidelines instead of a requirement,
56. Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 194, § 4965, 28 Stat. 965, 965 (repealed 1947) (providing
copyright protection for paintings, drawings, engravings, etchings, prints, models, and
photographs); Tepp, supra note 53, at 93.
57. See Act of Mar. 2, 1895 § 4965, 28 Stat. at 965 (awarding between $100 and $5000
for infringement of photographs and between $250 and $10,000 for infringement of
paintings, drawings, engravings, etchings, prints, and models); Tepp, supra note 53, at 93.
58. See Act of Mar. 2, 1895 § 4965, 28 Stat. at 965; Tepp, supra note 53, at 93.
59. See Tepp, supra note 53, at 93 (labeling the Act a change to "the traditional manner
of calculation of statutory damages").
60. See ABE A. GOLDMAN, STUDY NO. 1: THE HISTORY OF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION FROM 1901 TO 1954, at 1 (1955), reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, at 1 (detailing the legislative process for the Copyright

Act of 1909); Ferch, supra note 38, at 490 ("The Copyright Act of 1909 was the first major
revision of the federal copyright laws.").
61. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealedby Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INST., OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 8 (1973).

62. See Tepp, supra note 53, at 93 ("The Copyright Act of 1909 generally carried
forward the statutory damages provisions of the 1895 Act .... ).
63. Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 25(b), 35 Stat. at 1081; see also Samuelson & Wheatland,
supra note 48, at 448 (discussing the new actual damages provision).
64. Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 25(b), 35 Stat. at 1081 (allowing a copyright owner to recover
actual damages or "in lieu" of that, a statutory damage award).
65. See STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 7-8 (discussing when courts would award statutory
damages).
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and set a statutory minimum and maximum that governed all damage
awards. 67 Congress spent a great deal of time and effort to ensure the
statutory range would
properly compensate copyright owners and deter
68
future infringement.
The damage provision created in 1909 was still in place in 1955 when
Congress commissioned a study on the problems with copyright law and the
need for reform. 69 The Copyright Office prepared thirty-five studies on the
state of copyright law, including one that focused on the damage
provision. 70 Based on these studies, the Register of Copyrights issued 7a1
report to Congress in 1961 recommending that copyright law be revised.
The goals of amending the damage provision were twofold: clearing up the
confusion and uncertainty surrounding the provision and providing courts
with the discretion to tailor awards to the facts of each case in order to
avoid artificial or rigid awards. 72 The legislative process began in 1964 and
featured twelve years of draft bills and revisions until the Act was finally
passed in 1976. 73 Congress followed many of the recommendations for
amending the statute and made a number of significant changes. 74 The
result of this revision was a damage provision featuring the same basic
75
structure employed today.
3. An Outline of the Current Statutory Scheme
Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 504, the current provision governing damage
awards for copyright infringement is the result of centuries worth of
revisions and amendments. 76 Today, any copyright holder who has
registered his work with the U.S. Copyright Office before it is infringed can
elect to receive either actual or statutory damages at any time before the
final verdict. 77 If a copyright owner elects to receive statutory damages, no
67. Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 25, 35 Stat. at 1081 (listing each type of work copyright law
protected and a per-infringement amount for the court to use as a guide when deciding the
size of a statutory award); see also Ferch, supra note 38, at 490 (detailing the "elaborate
system" of per infringed work amounts in the statute).
68. See 1 PATRY, supra note 39, at 74; Tepp, supra note 53, at 93.
69. See 1 PATRY, supra note 39, at 74-75.
70. STRAUSS, supra note 45. See generally 1-2 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45 (reprinting all of the studies).
71. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS], reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 45, at 3; see also 1 PATRY, supra note 39, at 74-75 (discussing the

legislative history of the 1976 Act).
72. See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, COPYRIGHT REVISION ACT OF 1976, at 252 (1976).

73. See 1 PATRY, supra note 39, at 78-89.
74. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 451-63 (discussing the changes
made by the Act); infra Part I.A.3.

75. Compare Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585,
with 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 48-75.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 504; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 23, § 14.01 [B]. Since the

Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright owner has had the right to choose which type of
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evidence of the actual damage suffered is required. 78 However, the court
may consider any evidence of the harm caused by infringement that is
available when fixing the size of the award. 79 Other factors the court may
consider include the parties' conduct and the effectiveness of the award in
deterring the defendant and the public in general from future
80
infringement.
The current statutory damage provision no longer features a "per
infringement" or "per sheet" standard for assessing damages. 8 1 Congress
made this change in 1976 to alleviate concerns that per-infringement awards
presented a copyright owner with too many potential causes of action and
would lead to excessive awards. 82 Now, a copyright owner recovers a
'83
minimum of $750 and a maximum of $30,000 "per infringed work.
Where the award falls within that range is entirely at the discretion of the
district court, 84 as the only guidance Congress has provided is that the
85
amount should be 'just."
There are additional statutory damage levels that function as exceptions
to the standard minimum and maximum and are awarded based on the
defendant's conduct. 86 Congress added an "innocent infringer" provision in
1976, which allows the court the discretion to lower the damage award to
$200 per infringed work if the "infringer was not aware and had no reason
'87
to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.
This provision alleviates concerns with excessive awards in cases of
"occasional or isolated innocent infringement" 88 while still providing a
copyright owner compensation for his injury and deterring future infringing
damages is awarded. See Ferch, supra note 38, at 504 (discussing this "fundamental" change
to copyright law).
78. See Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459 (D. Md.
2004) (finding that statutory damages do not have to "be strictly related to actual injury");
NEIL BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW 302 (1981) (noting that statutory damages are not tied to
proof of actual damages).
79. See 2 PATRY, supra note 39, at 1172-73 (including the plaintiff's lost revenues and
the defendant's profits and expenses saved among relevant factors for the court to consider).
80. See id.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 447,
453, 455 (discussing the shift to a "per infringed work" rule and its effects).
82. See STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 11-12; Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at
453.
83. The statutory range has increased twice since it was set at $250 to $10,000 per
infringed work in 1976. See Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774, 1774 (increasing the limits to $750
and $30,000); Beme Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 10,
102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (increasing the limits to $500 and $20,000); Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 (setting the statutory range at $250 to
$10,000 per infringed work).
84. See 2 PATRY, supra note 39, at 1172 (compiling cases).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
86. Id. § 504(c)(2); see also Ross, supra note 26, § 2.02[3][g].
87. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). The minimum award for innocent infringement was
originally set at $100 per infringed work in the Copyright Act of 1976, § 504(c)(2).
88. See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 72, at 254.
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acts. 89 The statute also allows the court to raise the maximum award to
$150,000 if the copyright owner can prove that the infringement was
committed "willfully." 90 Although the 1976 Act did not set out the
definition of willful, courts have since construed the willful infringement
provision to be applicable when a defendant has knowledge that her
conduct represents an infringement. 91
Statutory damage awards for copyright infringement continue to serve
the same two purposes they have served since the Statute of Anne:
providing adequate compensation to copyright owners harmed by
infringement and deterring future infringing acts. 92 Actual damage awards
are frequently inadequate in both these respects, so Congress has carefully
crafted a statute that ensures both these goals are met. 93 The failings of
actual damages to provide adequate compensation generally stem from
difficulties a plaintiff faces when attempting to prove the harm suffered due
to an infringement. 94 Infringement is often difficult for a copyright owner
to discover and detect. 95 It can also be extremely costly to prove the
amount of harm suffered when infringement is found because of the
difficulty in establishing the value of a copyright and the speculative nature
of the damages. 96 And even in cases where copyright owners can easily
find infringement and easily prove actual damages, the injury is frequently
small and will often cost more to prove than the amount that would be
recovered. 97 When faced with the prospect of a recovery that would not
even cover the expenses incurred in an infringement suit, a copyright owner
will generally forgo investigating the infringements and litigating the

89. See Ferch, supra note 38, at 505-06.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). The willful infringement maximum was originally $50,000
in the Copyright Act of 1976 § 504(c)(2).

91. See, e.g., Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1335 n.3 (9th Cir.
1990); Fitzgerald Pub. Co. v. Baylor Pub. Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986); United

States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Neb. 1991); Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary
Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
23, § 14.04[B][3].
92. See REGISTEROF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 71, at 103; Ferch, supra note 38, 487-88.
93. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952)

(describing the statutory damages provision as having been "formulated after long
experience"); REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 71, at 102-03 (discussing the need for

statutory damage awards).
94. See Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460 (D. Md.

2004) ("Statutory damages exist in part because of the difficulties in proving ... actual harm
in copyright infringement actions."); see also F. W. Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 230-33;
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 71, at 102.
95. See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 77-78 (2005); REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,

supra note 71, at 102.
96. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 95, at 75-76; REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note

71, at 102; see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 446 n.22 (providing
examples of why it can be difficult and costly to prove actual harm, such as the infringing
party not keeping accurate records regarding their sales or the parties exploiting different
markets).
97. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 71, at 102.
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case. 98 If the copyright statute forced copyright owners to prove their
actual damages-instead of allowing them to elect to receive a statutory
damage award-it would frequently lead to underenforcement and
undercompensation. 99 Statutory damages are thus required to provide the
necessary incentive for copyright owners to register their works, enforce
their copyrights, and seek compensation when their works are infringed. 100
Statutory damages are also more effective than actual damages at
deterring copyright infringement. 101 In many cases, the injury caused to the
copyright owner is simply the cost of a license to use the copyrighted
work. 102 If a potential infringer knows that the most he will have to pay for
illegally using a work would be the same amount he would pay for using it
legally, he will not be deterred from infringing the work. 10 3 Statutory
damage awards are necessary to provide "a high enough penalty so that
defendants will realize that it is less expensive to comply with the law than
to violate it.' 1 ° 4 In addition, damage awards for copyright infringement
must be large enough to deter the public, not just the defendant, from future
acts of infringement, an end that small awards of actual damages often
cannot accomplish. 10 5 Instead, larger awards, like those awarded under the
damage scheme, are necessary to provide a proper
current statutory
06
deterrent.1
4. The Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act
of 1999
The Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act
of 1999 set the minimum and maximum statutory damage awards at their
current levels. 10 7 The Act changed the range for statutory damages for the
second time since 1976, increasing the minimum statutory award from $500
to $750, the maximum statutory award from $20,000 to $30,000, and the
maximum statutory award for willful infringement to $150,000.108 The
award for innocent infringement, however, remained at $200.109 Congress
increased the statutory damage awards for two reasons. 110 First, they
98. See id.
99. See BLAIR & COTTER,supra note 95, at 77-78.
100. See id.; see also Ross, supra note 26, § 2.02[3] ("[T]he guarantee of statutory
damages will induce copyright owners to invest in and enforce their copyrights.").
101. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 71, at 102-03.
102. See id. at 102.
103. See id.
104. 2 PATRY, supra note 39, at 1172.
105. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 60 (arguing that compensating
copyright owners for their actual losses is not always sufficient to deter others from
committing infringing acts).
106. See id.
107. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L.
106-160, 113 Stat. 1774; see also Ross, supra note 26, § 2.02[3][d] (discussing the Act).
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006); see also Ross, supra note 26, § 2.02[3][c]-[d].
109. See Tepp, supra note 53, at 94.
110. See Ross, supra note 26, § 2.02[31[d].
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adjusted the range to account for inflation."'1 Second, and even more
importantly, lawmakers expressed concerns that statutory damage awards
needed to be larger to help combat widespread digital copyright
infringement.11 2 Piracy of copyrighted works had resulted in "lost jobs to
American workers, lost taxes to Federal and State governments, and lost
revenue to American companies." 113 Infringement had become extremely
easy because of the Internet and other digital technology, and copyright
infringers were both willfully and ignorantly violating current copyright
laws. 14 This bipartisan bill aimed to curb the negative economic impact of
copyright infringement on copyright owners and the U.S. economy as a
whole. 11 5 Congress believed that increasing the damage award for
copyright infringement would be a significant deterrent to those who
to compensate copyright
pirated copyrighted works 116 and would 1help
17
owners for injuries caused by infringement.
B. The RIAA's Litigation CampaignAgainst P2PNetwork Users
In September 2003, the RIAA announced that it had filed lawsuits
against 261 P2P network users for downloading and distributing
copyrighted music online and promised thousands more suits to follow. 18
These lawsuits signaled the beginning of a new campaign aimed at
increasing awareness of the illegality of online downloading, as well as
deterring the practice, by targeting individuals who shared music online
with copyright infringement lawsuits.119 The record labels had previously
these
only targeted the services and the individuals who ran them, 120 but 21
lawsuits proved largely unsuccessful in stopping illegal downloading.'
111. 145 CONG. REc. 30,786 (1999). Though the rates provided by the current statutory
damages provision may seem high, when adjusted for inflation the current range is lower
than in the past. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 68-69 tbls.1 & 2.
112. See 145 CONG. REC. 30,785-86, 31,312-13; see also Ross, supra note 26,
§ 2.02[3][d].
113. 145 CONG.REc. 31,312.
114. See 145 CONG. REc. 30,785.
115. See Tepp, supra note 53, at 94.
116. See 145 CONG. REC. 31,312-13; 145 CONG. REc. 30,785-86.
117. See Tepp, supra note 53, at 94.
118. See Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, The High Cost of Sharing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
2003, at B1.
119. See David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and
Intellectual Property Reverse PrivateAttorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1685, 1701-02 (2005); McBride & Smith, supra note 6.
120. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
(shutting down the Grokster P2P service); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th
Cir. 2003) (shutting down the Aimster file-sharing service); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001), remanded to No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 (N.D. Cal.,
Mar. 5, 2001) (shutting down Napster); John Borland, RIAA Sues Campus File-Swappers,
CNET NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1027-995429.html (discussing
lawsuits filed against four college students who hosted P2P file sharing networks at their
schools); see also Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing
Conflict Between Copyright Law and Peer-to-PeerTechnology, 28 CAMIBELL L. REv. 195,
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In order to find defendants for their lawsuits, the record labels hired
investigators to join the P2P services and search for users who were
"sharing" their recordings. 122 The RIAA then used the IP addresses found
by the investigators and subpoenaed Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to
provide them with the names and street addresses of users. 123 Over the
course of five years, record labels filed nearly 35,000 lawsuits. 124 The
RIAA reached out to each defendant with a settlement offer, 125 and the
majority of the lawsuits did, in fact, reach a settlement for an amount
ranging from $3000 to $11,000.126 It has since been announced that the
RIAA is continuing to pursue any infringement action they have
commenced, 127 but they will now try to work with ISPs on new strategies to
curb infringement instead of filing new lawsuits. 128 To date, only two of
the thousands of suits have actually been tried, Thomas-Rasset and
Tenenbaum. 129 These cases are the flash point in the debate over the
constitutionality of statutory damage awards and are discussed in turn in
this part.
198-201 (2006) (noting that in the beginning copyright owners fought infringement by suing
the services); Shana Dines, Note, Actual Interpretation Yields "Actual Dissemination": An
Analysis of the "Make Available" Theory Argued in Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing Lawsuits,
and Why Courts Ought To Reject It, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 157, 162-66 (2009)
(tracing the recent history of copyright infringement lawsuits filed by the RIAA).
121. See Opderbeck, supra note 119, at 1699-702; Kristina Groennings, Note, Costs and
Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
571, 572-73 (2005).
122. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 3, at 2.
123. See id.; Opderbeck, supra note 119, at 1702. The RIAA originally used the
subpoena power granted in the copyright statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (allowing a
copyright owner to subpoena an ISP in order to force it to identify a subscriber accused of
copyright infringement). But it was held in RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), that the manner in which the RIAA was using this subpoena power
was illegal, so they were forced to file "John Doe Lawsuits" for each IP address before
obtaining the subpoenas. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 3, at 4.
124. See McBride & Smith, supra note 6.
125. See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 653,
663-64 (2005); Daniel Reynolds, Note, The RJAA Litigation War on File Sharing and
Alternatives More Compatible with Public Morality, 9 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 977, 982
(2008).
126. ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 3, at 5.
127. See Nate Anderson, Hypocrisy or Necessity? RIAA Continues Filing Lawsuits, ARS
TECHNICA, Mar. 9 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/03/hypocrisy-ornecessity-riaa-continues-filing-lawsuits.ars.
128. See McBride & Smith, supra note 6 (discussing the RIAA's plan to work with ISPs
to combat infringement). Though the RIAA claims its lawsuit program has been effective,
there is disagreement over whether that claim is true. Compare ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
supra note 3, at 9-13 (discussing numerous reasons the lawsuit program did not work,
including the continued widespread use of P2P networks and creation of more efficient and
more private P2P services), with RIAA, For Students
Doing Reports,
http://www.riaa.org/faq.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (claiming the major increases in the
recording industry's digital revenues and halt to the growth of P2P downloading are proof of
the program's success).
129. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2009); Jonathan Saltzman, Civil Trial Opens on Sharing

of Songs, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 2009, at B 1.
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1. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset
The major record labels filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against
Jammie Thomas-Rasset on April 19, 2006.130 Thomas-Rasset, a single
mother from Minnesota, was alleged to have "shared" music through the
popular P2P downloading service Kazaa because she allowed other users to
download music from her hard drive. 13 1 Though her hard drive contained
over 1700 songs, 132 the record labels only sued for the unauthorized
distribution of twenty-four of them. 133 In 2007, Thomas-Rasset was found
to have willfully infringed the copyrights of all twenty-four songs, and the
plaintiffs were awarded $222,000 in statutory damages. 134 However, in
May 2008, Judge Michael Davis informed the parties that his instruction to
the jury that "making copyrighted sound recordings available" for users of a
P2P network to download violated the record labels' exclusive right of
distribution may have been in error. 135 Federal courts are currently split as
136
to whether "making available" or "actual dissemination" is distribution,
so Judge Davis called for briefs and oral arguments in order to determine
which formulation was proper. 137 Judge Davis ultimately rejected the
"make available" theory, holding that requiring actual dissemination is the
logical interpretation of the Copyright Act, and ordered a new trial. 138 In
dicta in the new trial order, Judge Davis pleaded with Congress to amend
the Copyright Act's statutory damage provision, as he believed it had
resulted in an award that was "wholly disproportionate" to the harm caused
to the record labels. 139

130. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212 (D. Minn. 2008).
131. Id. at 1212-13, 1215; see also Ken Nicholds, Note, The Free Jammie Movement: Is
Making a File Available to Other Users over a Peer-To-Peer Computer Network Sufficient

To Infringe the Copyright Owner's 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) DistributionRight?, 78 FORDHAM L.
REv. 983, 997-98 (2009) (discussing the case).
132. See Opposition to Thomas-Rasset Motion, supra note 19, at 3-4.
133. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
134. Id. at 1213.
135. Id.
136. See generally Dines. supra note 120 (discussing the two theories of distribution);

Nicholds, supra note 131 (same). There are a number of courts that use the "making
available" standard to define distribution. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001); At. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654, at *18-19 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008); Motown Record Co. v.
DePietro, No. 04-CV-2246, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *12 n.38 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16,
2007). But there are also many that require actual dissemination. See, e.g., Nat'l Car Rental
Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1993); Elektra Entm't
Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); At. Recording Corp.
v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008).
137. See Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213; see also Nicholds, supranote 131, at 999-1000.
138. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225-28; see also Nicholds, supra note 131, at 1000-01.
139. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
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The retrial occurred in June 2009,140 and the record labels presented
evidence that the songs were actually downloaded (disseminated) from
Thomas-Rasset's hard drive.' 4 1 Once again the jury found that ThomasRasset willfully infringed the copyrights of the record labels and awarded
the plaintiffs an even larger award than the first trial-$1.92 million, or
$80,000 per song. 142 Thomas-Rasset moved for a new trial on a number of
grounds, including an argument that the award was unconstitutional under
Gore.143
However, Judge Michael Davis declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the award, and instead remitted the award to $54,000,
which he determined was the maximum amount a reasonable jury could
have awarded. 144
The plaintiffs declined this remitted amount,
45
necessitating a third trial on the issue of damages. 1
2. Sony BMG Music Entertainmentv. Tenenbaum
The second of the RIAA lawsuits to go to trial began in July 2009.146
Like Jammie Thomas-Rasset, the RIAA accused Joel Tenenbaum, a 25year-old graduate student, of downloading and distributing music through
P2P networks in violation of the record labels' copyrights. 14 7 Charles
Nesson, a professor at Harvard Law School, led Tenenbaum's defense after
Judge Nancy Gertner encouraged him to do so. 148 Nesson's defense of the
case was unconventional and erratic, to the point that Judge Gertner
characterized it as "truly chaotic." 149 However, none of Nesson's tactics
mattered much after Joel Tenenbaum admitted on the witness stand that he
had been lying from the beginning and he had downloaded and distributed
50
music. 1

140. See Memorandum of Law & Order, supra note 10, at 5; Steve Karnowski, Music
Cos. Vow To Show Minn. Woman Shared 24 Songs, ABC NEWS, June 15, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=7844261.
141. See Opposition to Thomas-Rasset Motion, supra note 19, at 4.
142. See Memorandum of Law & Order, supra note 10, at 5.
143. See Thomas-Rasset Motion for a New Trial, supra note 15, at 4-5.
144. Memorandum of Law & Order, supra note 10, at 17-22, 26 (finding that any amount
over $54,000 would be "monstrous and shocking").
145. Memorandum of Law & Order, supra note 10, at 3 (ordering plaintiffs to accept
remittitur or ask for a new trial on damages); Notice of Plaintiffs' Decision RE: Remittitur,
supra note 10, at 6 (declining remittitur and requesting a new trial). At the time of this
Note's publication, the third trial had not yet occurred.
146. Revised Scheduling Order at 2, Capitol Records Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 03cvl 1661-NG
(D. Mass. May 28, 2009).
147. See Saltzman, supra note 129.
148. See John Schwartz, Tilting at Internet Barrier,a Stalwart Is Upended, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2009, at A11.
149. Memorandum and Order at 2, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No.
07cv1 1446-NG (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009) (elaborating upon the decision to deny use of a fair
use defense). Nesson ignored deadlines and even recorded conferences with the judge and
opposing counsel without consent. Id. at 2 n.3.
150. See Jonathan Saltzman, BU Student Admits Illegal Downloads, BOSTON GLOBE, July
31, 2009, at BI (noting that Tenenbaum admitted liability); Ben Sheffner, Oy Tenenbaum!
RIAA Wins $675,000, or $22,500 per Song, ARS TECI-INICA, July 31, 2009,
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As a result of this revelation, Judge Gertner ordered a directed verdict on
the issue of infringement, leaving only the issues of willfulness and total
damages in the hands of the jury. 15 1 The jury deliberated for only three
hours before finding Tenenbaum's infringement was willful and awarding
152
the plaintiffs $675,000, or $22,500 for each of the thirty songs.
Tenenbaum plans to appeal the verdict and is aiming to have it overturned
on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally excessive. 153 Judge Gertner, like
Judge Davis, has expressed unease over the Copyright Act's current
statutory damage provision.' 54 Concerned with the "deep potential for
155
injustice," she "implore[d]" Congress to change the copyright statute.
Judge Gertner also held a 56posttrial proceeding to determine if the damage
award is unconstitutional.1
C. The Supreme Court and the Review of Damage Awards
Many of the arguments between commentators and parties to copyright
infringement suits over the constitutionality of statutory damages after
Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum center around finding the proper standard
of constitutional review. Those who argue that statutory damage awards for
copyright infringement are unconstitutional do so by drawing comparisons
to punitive damage awards. They assert that the same metric courts use to
determine the constitutionality of punitive awards should be applied to
But others argue that statutory damages are
statutory awards. 157
significantly different than punitive damages, and courts should undertake a
different, more deferential, review of the awards. 15 8 For this Note it is
important to explore the Supreme Court's jurisprudence surrounding both
statutory and punitive awards. Part I.C. 1 details Gore and the constitutional
guideposts it created to review punitive damage awards. Part I.C.2
discusses Williams and the standard it outlines for the review of statutory
damages.

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/o-tenenbaum-riaa-wins-675000-or-22500per-song.ars.
151. See

Sheffner,

supra

note

150;

Copyrights

&

Campaigns,

http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2009/07/plaintiffs-win-tenenbaum-casecourt.html (July 31, 2009, 04:02 EST).
152. See Judgment, supra note 12, at 1;Jonathan Saltzman, Student Must Pay $675kfor
Songs, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2009, at A 1;Sheffner, supra note 150.
153. See Matthew Hutchins, Trial Judge Sinks Nesson's Piracy Defense, HARV. L. REc.,
Dec. 3, 2009, at 11.
154. Memorandum and Order, supra note 149, at 34-35.

155. Id. at 34.
156. Sheri Qualters, At Hearing, Boston Music Downloader Argues for New Trial or
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
L.J.,
Feb. 23, 2010,
Verdict,
NAT'L
Reduced
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202444421502&At-hearingBoston musicdownloader..arguesfor

-new trial or reducedverdict&slretum=l&hbxlogin=l#.
publication, no decision had been reached.
157. See infra Part II.A.
158. See infra Part I.B.

At the time of this Note's
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1. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore-The Constitutional Standard for
Punitive Damages
The Supreme Court's standard for assessing the constitutionality of a
punitive damage award was articulated in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore.159 The case involved a plaintiff who bought a BMW that had been
damaged and repainted. 160 The jury found that because the dealership
failed to disclose that the car was damaged, it had violated an Alabama
fraud statute, and awarded the plaintiff a $4000 compensatory award and a
$4 million punitive award.' 6 1 After the Alabama Supreme Court reduced
the punitive damages to $2 million because the jury had improperly
punished BMW for its acts in other jurisdictions,1 62 the U.S. Supreme Court
undertook its own review of the award to determine if it complied with due
process. 16 3 The Court held that the Constitution requires that a person
receive "fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose."' 164 It determined that an award of $2 million was grossly
excessive and did not give BMW notice of the size of the penalty it faced
for its actions. 165 The Court concluded that the punitive damage award
assessed against BMW violated due process and thus reversed the award.1 66
The Court's decision was based upon three guideposts it articulated to
determine when adequate notice of the size of a punitive damage award has
been given and, thus, when that award is constitutional.' 67 The first
68
guidepost is "the degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's actions.'
The Court reasoned that because "some wrongs are more blameworthy than
others," the size of a punitive damage award should be tied to the
defendant's conduct.' 69 The Gore Court believed that this guidepost may
159. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 464 ("Gore is the foundational ruling
of the U.S. Supreme Court's modem due process jurisprudence on punitive damages.").
160. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996); see also Bruce J. McKee,
The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages Litigation: Observations
from a Participant,48 ALA. L. REv. 175, 181 (1996) (detailing the damage to the car).
161. Gore, 517 U.S. at 565; see also McKee, supra note 160 at 183.
162. Gore, 517 U.S. at 567; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627-29 (Ala.
1994); see also Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Roadfor Evaluating
Punitive Damages: Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH.

J.L. REFORM 441, 456 (2004); John Zenneth Lagrow, Comment, BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore: Due ProcessProtection Against Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 32 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 157, 178 (1997).
163. Gore, 517 U.S. at 562-63.

164. Id. at 574.
165. Id. at 574-75; see also Lagrow, supra note 162, at 181.
166. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574; see also Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 162, at 458-59.
167. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75; see also McKee, supra note 160, at 185; Paul M. Sykes,
Note, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Punitive Damages Guideposts in

BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1084, 1090 (1997).
168. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.

169. Id.; see also Lagrow, supra note 162, at 180. The Court later elaborated upon the
factors that should be considered when determining the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, including whether the injury "was physical as opposed to economic," the conduct
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be the most important factor in judging the reasonableness of a punitive
award. 170 The second guidepost is the ratio between the actual harm the
defendant caused and the size of the punitive damage award. 171 The Court
recognized that requiring punitive damages to be reasonably related to
actual damages was the most common measure of a punitive award's
excessiveness. 172 However, it refused to draw a bright-line rule regarding
what is reasonable.' 73 The third and final guidepost requires a comparison
of the award to civil sanctions for similar misconduct. 174 The Court
believed that because legislatures spend a great deal of time and effort
determining the proper size of a penalty, courts reviewing damage awards
should give deference to their decisions. 175 Since the Gore decision, the
govern
Court has made clear on numerous occasions that these guideposts
76
the review of the constitutionality of a punitive damage award. 1
2. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams-The
Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages
The Supreme Court outlined the standard for determining the
constitutionality of a statutory damage award in St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
Southern Railway Co. v. Williams. The decision elaborated upon the
review created in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 a case that upheld a
statutory damage award of $1.6 million against a Texas oil company for
violating two state antitrust laws. 178 The Waters-Pierce Court recognized
that the damage award at issue was large, but held that the Court could
"only interfere with such legislation and judicial action of the States
as to amount to
enforcing it if the fines imposed [were] so grossly excessive
179
a deprivation of property without due process of law."'
The Williams Court used Waters-Pierceas a baseline, but refined the due
process standard for statutory damages and added an element of

displayed "an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others," and if
"the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident." State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at
576-77).
170. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575; see also Lagrow, supra note 162, at 180; McKee, supra note
160, at 187.
171. Gore, 517U.S. at580.
172. Id.; see also Lagrow, supra note 162, at 180.
173. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582-83; see also Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 162, at 457-58;
McKee, supra note 160, at 189.
174. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583.
175. Id.; see also Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 162, at 458.
176. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003);
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001).
177. 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
178. Id. at 96-97, 111-12; see also Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The
Problem of Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. REv. 103, 117-18 (2009).
179. Waters-Pierce,212 U.S. at 111-12 (citing Coffey v. County of Harlan, 204 U.S. 659
(1907)).
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proportionality. 180 The case involved an Arkansas statute that regulated the
rates a railroad company could charge and prescribed a statutory award for
its violation.' 81 Two sisters who were charged sixty-six cents more than the
82
statute allowed brought a suit against the company operating the train.1
The jury awarded seventy-five dollars to the plaintiffs, and the train
company appealed, claiming a violation of due process. 183 The Court held
that while the Due Process Clause does place a limit on a legislature's
ability to determine sanctions for wrongful conduct, lawmakers are still
afforded "a wide latitude of discretion" in where they set statutory
penalties. 184 A statutory damage award only violates the Due Process
Clause when "the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be
wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable."' 8 5 This
standard has governed the review of the constitutionality of a statutory
damage award for the past ninety years.18 6 Since the Gore decision, courts
damage awards and
have declined to use the guideposts to review statutory
87
continue to rely on the standard outlined in Williams. 1
II. DETERMINING WHETHER COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE SUPREME
COURT'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE TO STATUTORY
DAMAGE AWARDS

Part I of this Note explored copyright's damage provision and its
development, the RIAA's lawsuits against P2P network users, and the
Supreme Court's statutory and punitive damages jurisprudence. These
discussions provided important background for the debate over which
constitutional standard should be applied to statutory damages for copyright
infringement. This part now presents the arguments on each side of that
debate. Part II.A first considers why some commentators and defendants in
copyright infringement lawsuits believe that Gore should be used to review
statutory damage awards. Then, Part II.B discusses the reasons other
commentators as well as record labels argue Gore has no application in the
review of statutory damage awards.

180. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919); see
also Scheuerman, supra note 178, at 116-18.
181. Williams, 251 U.S. at 63-64.
182. Id. at 64.
183. Id.

184. Id. at 66.
185. Id. at 66-67 (citations omitted); see also Scheuerman, supra note 178, at 117-18.
186. See Scheuerman, supra note 178, at 122-23.
187. See, e.g., Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir.
2007) (rejecting the Gore guideposts in favor of the Williams standard); Verizon Cal. Inc. v.
OnlineNIC, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84235, at *20 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 25, 2009) (same); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Bundy-Howard, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 905,
2001) (same).
914 & n.6 (N.D. I11.
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A. Arguments That Courts Should Use Gore To Review Statutory Damages
The argument that courts should apply the Gore guideposts to statutory
damage awards for copyright infringement is primarily based on the
similarities between statutory and punitive damage awards. Part II.A. 1
discusses the constitutional concerns statutory damages share with punitive
damages, first focusing on arbitrariness and uncertainty before turning to
excessiveness.
Part II.A.2 discusses the similar purposes served by
statutory damages in the context of copyright infringement and punitive
damages.
1. The Constitutional Issues Common to Statutory and Punitive Damages
a. Arbitrarinessand Uncertainty
The arbitrariness and uncertainty surrounding the size of punitive damage
awards are major constitutional concerns.1 88 In order for a punitive damage
award to reach the standard of fairness the Due Process Clause requires,
189
there must be some level of consistency in the way juries assess awards.
Such consistency is necessary to provide potential wrongdoers with the
requisite notice of the severity of the punishment they may face for their
actions.1 90
For this reason, as Justice Breyer's concurrence stated,
providing consistency and ensuring punitive awards are not arbitrary were
both major motivations for the creation of the Gore guideposts. 191
The Supreme Court was particularly concerned with inconsistent punitive
damage awards in different cases involving similar conduct. 92 Similarly,
since the creation of the first statutory damage award range for copyright
infringement in 1895, commentators have argued that courts apply the
Copyright Act's statutory scheme inconsistently in similar situations and,
thus, it is arbitrary. 19 3 In his review of the remedial system of copyright
law as it existed in 1939, Julian Caplan discussed the "controversy"
surrounding the system of awarding judgments between the minimum and
maximum set in the statute. 194 Caplan noted that despite the limits placed

188. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008) ("The real problem,

it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.").
189. See id. at 2625-26 (discussing the Court's concern with ensuring consistency in
order to provide fairness).
190. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (discussing the notice
required by the Due Process Clause).
191. Id. at 586-97 (Breyer, J., concurring).
192. See Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (finding that variations in the size of punitive
awards may be desirable if it was because courts were tailoring their decisions to find the
"optimal" award based on the facts, but that this was generally not the case); see also Gore,
517 U.S. at 565 & n.8 (noting that in a case with very similar facts decided shortly before
Gore, the jury awarded a similar compensatory award with no punitive damages).
193. See Julian Caplan, The Measure of Recovery in Actions for the Infringement of
Copyright, 37 MICH. L. REv. 564, 572-75 (1939).

194. Id. at 573-75. At the time of Caplan's article, the minimum was $250 and the
maximum was $5000. See id. at 575.
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195
on the size of each award, judgments varied greatly from case to case.
Some courts awarded the maximum while some courts awarded only the
minimum amount while expressing their displeasure that they were even
required to award that much. 196 Caplan found it "impossible to find any
97
rationalization" for the discrepancies. 1
Commentators have continued this line of argument in relation to the
current copyright statute. 198 A comparison of the RIAA lawsuits that have
resulted in default or summary judgment against the defendant-and a
minimum statutory award of $750 per song 199-to the much larger jury
awards in Tenenbaum and the two Thomas-Rasset trials 200 illustrates the
inconsistent application of the statutory damage provision and the arbitrary
nature of the resulting awards. 20 1 While all of these cases had similar facts,
the results could not be more different. 20 2 Additionally, as Jammie
Thomas-Rasset has argued, evidence of the "arbitrariness, variability, and
unpredictability in awards" can be found in the huge difference between the
sizes of the verdicts in her first two trials. 20 3 Even though these two trials
clearly had the same exact facts, the first jury assessed an award of $9250
per song, 20 4 while the second jury awarded $80,000 per song. 20 5 The fact
that the second jury's award is almost nine times larger is evidence that
statutory damage awards for copyright infringement implicate the same
concerns of arbitrariness and uncertainty as punitive damage awards. 20 6

195. See id. at 574.
196. Compare Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355
(7th Cir. 1929) (awarding the minimum), and M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412,
414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927) (same), with Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 208, 210 (1935)
(awarding the maximum), and Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 977, 985
(W.D.N.Y. 1936) (same).
197. Caplan, supra note 193, at 574-75.
198. See, e.g., Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 54-56 (providing examples of
inconsistent application); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 485-88 (discussing
how easy it is to find inconsistent applications of the statute).
199. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-90, 893 (7th Cir. 2005)
(affirming the district court's award of $750 a song for thirty songs in summary judgment);
Warner Bros. Records Inc. v. Tait, No. 3:07-cv-134-J16-HTS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46034, at *7-9 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2008) (awarding $750 per song for seven songs in a
summary judgment); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, No. 5:06-CV-00120-BR, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 46414, at *4, *8 (E.D.N.C. June 26, 2007) (awarding $750 per song for eleven

songs in a default judgment).
200. See supra Part I.B. 1-2.

201. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 55-56 (discussing the discrepancies
and describing the awards in Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum as "arbitrary and capricious").
202. See id.

203. Reply in Support of Motion for a New Trial, Remittitur, and to Alter or Amend the
Judgment at 2, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-cv-1497 (D. Minn. Aug. 28,
2009) [hereinafter Thomas-Rasset Reply].
204. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008).
205. See Memorandum of Law & Order, supra note 10, at 5.

206. See Thomas-Rasset Reply, supra note 203, at 2.
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Much of the uncertainty surrounding statutory damage awards is due to
the size of the range Congress created. 20 7 The maximum of $150,000 per
infringed work is two hundred times greater than the minimum. 20 8 Courts
have discretion as to where to set an award within the range, so every
copyright infringement case features a great deal of uncertainty surrounding
the size of each statutory award.2 0 9 This uncertainty is compounded in
cases of multiple infringed works. 2 10 In many of the cases the record labels
brought against individuals, the P2P network users were downloading and
distributing hundreds, if not more than a thousand, songs.2 11 Copyright
owners may allege the infringement of one work, all the works, or any
number in between. 2 12 As a result, the statutory range for a single
infringement is essentially inapplicable, and the true range of the potential
liability a defendant may face for infringement is between the $200
minimum award for one instance of innocent infringement, and the
maximum $150,000 for willful infringement multiplied hundreds or
thousands of times over. 2 13 So in spite of the fact that a set maximum and
minimum govern statutory damages for copyright infringement, the
aggregation of multiple claims Icads to an extremely broad statutory range
and "open-ended damage judgments." 2 14 This results in arbitrary awards,
critics argue, so statutory damages for copyright infringement should be
subjected to the same level of judicial scrutiny as punitive damage
awards. 2 15
b. Excessiveness
In the Gore decision, the Court held that the punitive damage award at
issue violated due process because it was "grossly excessive." 2 16 But the
207. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 458-59 (noting that a statutory
damage award is not a fixed amount, the statutory range is broad, and statutory damages
punish a wide variety of wrongful acts); Evanson, supra note 14, at 621 (noting that large
statutory ranges such as the range for copyright infringement can lead to arbitrary awards).
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006); see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at
458-59.
209. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 459 ("Exactly where in this very broad
range any particular statutory award will be rendered is anybody's guess.").
210. See Evanson, supra note 14, at 624-25.
211. See id. at 625 (noting that most lawsuits against P2P network users involve over
1000 songs).
212. Jammie Thomas-Rasset shared approximately 1700 songs through Kazaa, and Joel
Tenenbaum admitted at trial to downloading and sharing hundreds of songs. See Opposition
to Thomas-Rasset Motion, supra note 19, at 3-4; Marguerite Reardon, BU Student Found
Liable in Music-Swapping Case, CNET NEWS, July 31, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/digitalmedia/?keyword=Joel+Tenenbaum. But, the record labels only sued for the infringement of
twenty-four and thirty works, respectively. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 152.
213. See Evanson, supra note 14, at 621-25 (finding that because file-sharing suits
generally involve over 1000 songs, it "effectively abrogates the cap" on statutory damage
awards).
214. Id. at 625-26.
215. Id. at 626.
216. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
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concern with excessively large awards is not confined to punitive
damages. 2 17 As the Court has made clear over the years, the excessiveness
2 18
issue that led to the creation of the Gore guideposts applies to all awards.
In a number of copyright infringement cases defendants have argued that
the Gore guideposts should apply to statutory damages because they are just
as susceptible to excessiveness as punitive damage awards and that the
Gore Court intended for the guideposts to apply to all excessive civil
sanctions. 2 19
The arguments that statutory damages for copyright
infringement are excessive generally take one of two forms: the damage
awards overcompensate and overdeter 220 or they are excessive in relation to
the actual harm the copyright owner has suffered. 22 1 The argument that
statutory damage awards are excessive because they overcompensate and
overdeter is based on the premise that there is an optimal level of
compensation and deterrence for copyright infringement and statutory
awards have a tendency to be greater than that level. 22 2 Even though
damage awards must be within a carefully crafted, legislatively created
range that is designed to serve the goals of copyright damages as accurately
as possible, as discussed previously, that range is actually quite large,
especially when claims are aggregated. 223 Since courts have a great deal of
discretion to fix awards within the wide range, some argue that the damage
awards that result are not an accurate reflection of important legislative
decisions regarding how best to punish and deter wrongful conduct. 224 As a
result, they conclude that statutory damage awards often overcompensate

217. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 492 ("[T]he Supreme Court has
applied due process excessiveness reviews to a wide variety of sanctions-not just to
punitive damages .... ).
218. The Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence makes clear that excessiveness
concerns are in regards to punishment in general. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (holding that due process proscribes excessive
punishments generally); Gore, 517 U.S. at 562 (same); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (same).
219. See, e.g., Thomas-Rasset Motion for a New Trial, supra note 15, at 4-5 (discussing
the application of Gore to civil punishments); Revised Amicus Brief of Free Software
Foundation in Connection with Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of
Unconstitutionality of Copyright Act Statutory Damages as Applied to Infringement of
Single MP3 Files at 4-5, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 07-CV-1 1446-NG (D.
Mass. May 18, 2009) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Free Software Foundation] (noting that
the guideposts were based on a review of the history of damage awards generally, not just
punitive awards).
220. See infra text accompanying notes 222-25.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 226-30.
222. See Evanson, supra note 14, at 621-22.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 207-14.
224. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 (1952)
(noting that statutory damages result from the "exercise of the wide judicial discretion");
Evanson, supra note 14, at 621, 626 (finding that statutory damage awards do not reflect
legislative decisions regarding proper punishment because the range is so large).
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and greatly exceed the award required to adequately deter
copyright holders
225
infringement.
Both commentators and defendants in copyright infringement suits have
argued far more frequently that statutory damages for copyright
infringement are excessive when compared to actual injury. 226 The theory
is that the actual harm each infringement caused is equal to the cost of
obtaining the song legally. 227 As one commentator has noted, even a
minimum statutory damage award of $750 seems excessive when compared
to one lost sale. 228 As the size of the damage awards moves further up the
statutory range, the awards become even more excessively large. 229 Many
commentators have gone so far as to label any portion of the judgment in
of actual harm caused the "punitive" part of the
excess of the amount
230
statutory award.
The excessiveness problem in statutory damage awards, both in terms of
overcompensation and overdeterrence, and in relation to harm caused,
becomes even more prevalent when multiple infringement claims are
aggregated. 2 3 1 Many who argue that Gore should be applied to statutory
damage awards for copyright infringement have drawn a comparison
between copyright infringement and class action suits, as they both involve
225. See Evanson, supra note 14, at 621-22 (noting the lack of restraint on excessively
large statutory damage awards).
226. Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims at 2, Lava Records LLC v.
Amurao, No. 07 CV 321 (CLB) (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 2007); Defendant Denise Cloud's Brief in
Support of Her Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss at 6, Sony BMG Entm't v. Cloud, No. 2:08
CV 01200 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2008); Defendant James Michael Boggs' Response in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims at 21-22, At.
Recording Corp. v. Boggs, No. 2:06-cv-00482 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2007); Samuelson &
Sheffher, supra note 14, at 55-56 (discussing the ratio of actual harm suffered to the
statutory award); J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against
Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects ofAggregating Minimum Statutory Damagesfor
Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REv. 525, 545-49 (2004) (comparing the harm caused
by P2P network users with the size of a statutory award).
227. This amount has been claimed to be as high as the cost of a CD and as low as the
thirty-five cent profit record labels make for selling a song on iTunes. See Capitol Records
Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008) (comparing the harm caused by
Thomas-Rasset to the cost of three CDs); Amicus Brief of Free Software Foundation, supra
note 219, at 1-2 & n. 1 (arguing that the copyright infringement of P2P network users causes
an injury of, at most, thirty-five cents).
228. See Barker, supra note 226, at 548.
229. See Thomas-Rasset Motion for a New Trial, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that the
$80,000 per song Jammie Thomas-Rasset was ordered to pay is more than 5000 times the
cost of a CD and over 60,000 times the cost of a song on iTunes).
230. See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 462; Barker, supra note 226, at
545-49.
231. Aggregating multiple claims can result in an even greater distortion of congressional
intent regarding compensation and deterrence as well as awards that are even more out of
line with the actual injury caused by infringement. See Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims at 13, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 03-CV-1 1661NG (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Defendant's Opposition] (arguing that aggregation
of statutory damage awards "exacerbates their gross excessiveness"); Evanson, supra note
14, at 624-26 ("[Alggregated damages may far exceed the award contemplated by the
legislature ....
).
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a large number of claims. 2 32 The case most frequently cited is Parker v.
Time Warner Entertainment Co., 2 3 3 which discussed the issues that arise
from aggregating a large number of statutory damage awards in the context
of a class action lawsuit.2 34 Parker involved the violation of consumer
privacy laws that allowed each cable subscriber to recover a minimum
The plaintiffs sought class
statutory damage award of $1000.235
certification for an estimated twelve million Time Warner Cable
subscribers. 236 The court was concerned with creating a situation
combining a minimum statutory award with a system that aggregates
numerous claims. 237 It reasoned that "[s]uch a combination may expand the
potential statutory damages so far beyond the actual damages suffered that
the statutory damages come to resemble punitive damages." 238 The court
cited the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence, including Gore,
and refused class certification out of fear that it would "distort[] the purpose
of ... statutory damages," create a "devastatingly large damages award, out
of all reasonable proportion to the actual harm suffered," and potentially
violate due process. 239 A number of courts have acknowledged the
relevance of Parker to copyright infringement cases. 240 Like statutory
damage awards aggregated in a class action, statutory damage awards for
copyright infringement can result in grossly excessive awards that are
due process problems
similar to punitive damages and "raise[]24substantive
1
like those raised in Gore and Campbell."
2. Statutory Damages Serve the Same Purpose as Punitive Damages
Commentators and defendants in copyright infringement suits have
argued that because statutory and punitive awards serve a similar purpose,
the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence should govern
statutory damage awards for copyright infringement. 242 Punitive damage
232. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 226, at 550-52; Evanson, supra note 14, at 618.
233. 331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003).
234. Id.

235. Id. at 15, 25.
236. Id. at 16.
237. Id. at 22.

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Lindor, No. CV-05-1095 (DGT), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83486, at *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2006) (discussing favorably the cases the

defendant cited in her briefs, which included Parker); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig.,
No. C 04-1671 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11498, at *38-39 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2005)

(discussing the application of Parker in a statutory damages context); see also Defendant's
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Answer at 3,
Lindor, No. CV-05-1095 (DGT) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006) (citing Parker); Amicus Brief of
Free Software Foundation, supra note 219, at 4-7 (detailing cases that have discussed
Parkerfavorably in the context of statutory damages).
241. Barker, supra note 226, at 552.
242. See, e.g., Defendant's Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Remittitur at
5-7, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-cv-1497 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2007) (discussing
the punitive nature of statutory awards); Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 59
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awards are intended to punish the defendant for his wrongful conduct and to
deter him and others from committing similar wrongful acts again. 243 Like
punitive damages, an important justification for the existence of statutory
damage awards for copyright infringement has always been that they deter
both the wrongdoer and the public in general from future acts of
infringement. 244 Courts have consistently acknowledged that deterring
future infringement is a primary goal of the statute. 245 Punishment, on the
other hand, has never been an express purpose of the statutory damage
provision.24 6 Nonetheless, it is frequently argued that statutory damages
punish infringers.
One formulation of the argument that statutory damages for copyright
infringement punish is that the "willful infringer" increases the award based
on the defendant's conduct and is thus punitive in nature. 247 Another
version of the argument posits that statutory damages punish as a means of
deterrence. 248 Professor Charles Nesson has taken this argument even
further. In his defense of Joel Tenenbaum he argued that when Congress
increased the size of statutory damage awards in 1999, it essentially enacted
a criminal statute enforced through the civil system. 249 Nesson contends
that the statute grants copyright owners a power that goes beyond the level
of a civil damage award intended to punish and into the realm of a criminal
250
sanction.
The opinion of many courts, that "another role has emerged for statutory
damages in copyright infringement cases [besides compensation]: that of a
punitive sanction on infringers," reinforces the view that statutory damages

(discussing the purposes of statutory damages); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at
460-61 (noting that courts have interpreted statutory damages for copyright infringement to
be punitive).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
245. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952)
(holding that statutory damages are "designed to discourage wrongful conduct"); St. Luke's
Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding
that deterrence is a consideration when awarding statutory damages).
246. The main goals of statutory damages for copyright infringement have always been to
compensate copyright holders and deter future infringement. See supra text accompanying
notes 101-06.
247. See, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, Inc. 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the
willful damages provision punishes); Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., Nos. C79-243-Y, C80-1899Y, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17276, at *25 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 1981) (noting the increase
allowed by the willful infringer provision "constitute[s] punitive damages"); see also
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 461 (discussing the willful infringer provision).
248. See Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that "deterrence is a
purpose of punishment"); Nat'l Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 131 F. Supp.
2d 458, 478 n. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citations omitted) (noting that statutory awards punish in
order to deter); see also Barker, supra note 226, at 548-49 (finding deterrence to be
accomplished through punishment).
249. See Defendant's Opposition, supra note 231, at 4-7.
250. See id. at 3 ("The 'Digital Theft Deterrence ... Act of 1999' is essentially a criminal
statute, punitively deterrent in its every substantive aspect .... ").
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serve a similar purpose to punitive damages and are intended to punish. 25 1
Like the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, many other courts
have expressly adopted the opinion that statutory damages serve the same
purpose as punitive damages, or at least a partly punitive purpose. 252 There
are also a number of courts that have impliedly accepted that rationale by
suggesting that statutory damage awards are "punishment. ' 253 The fact that
statutory damages punish and deter in the same manner as punitive damages
illustrates the punitive character of statutory damage awards. Since
statutory damages and punitive damages are used to accomplish similar
254
goals, they should be reviewed under the same constitutional standard.
B. Arguments That Gore Is the Wrong Standardfor Statutory Damages
Part II.A discussed the arguments for applying the Supreme Court's
punitive damage jurisprudence to statutory damages. This part explores the
arguments that the Gore guideposts should not govern statutory damage
awards for copyright infringement because they in no way implicate many
of the concerns that drove the Supreme Court to create them. Part II.B. 1
examines the constitutional concerns with punitive damages that are not
present with statutory damages, namely, the lack of a notice issue and
worry about unchecked jury discretion. Part II.B.2 discusses the tradition
of judicial deference for legislative decisions like the creation of the
minimum and maximum award for copyright infringement. Finally, Part
II.B.3 analyzes how poorly the Gore guideposts fit in a statutory damages
context.
1. Constitutional Concerns Underlying the Gore Decision That Are Not
Implicated by Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement
a. Lack of Notice
As the Gore Court stated, "Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in
our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the
severity of the penalty that a State may impose." 255 This concern with
adequate notice is what led the Court to review the constitutionality of the
251. Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996)
("[S]tatutory damages have evolved and now are intended
.
to punish the
defendant ... ").
252. See, e.g., On Davis, 246 F.3d at 172 (holding that the statutory damage provision is
used to accomplish the goals of punitive damages); Calio v. Sofa Express, Inc., 368 F. Supp.
2d 1290, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (quoting On Davis, 246 F.3d at 172); Nat ' FootballLeague,
131 F. Supp. 2d at 478 n. 17 (discussing the "punitive character" of statutory damages).
253. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998);
Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 496 (4th
Cir. 1996).
254. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 463 (concluding that the limits the
Supreme Court has placed on punitive damages should be applied to copyright damages).
255. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
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award. 256 Notice concerns with punitive damage awards result from the
fact that they are not set in a statute; rather, the court fixes them at some
potentially unlimited amount every time they are awarded,257and therefore,
the public has no prior indication of the size of the sanction.
Proponents of a more deferential standard of review argue that statutory
damage awards for copyright infringement do not exhibit the same
constitutional notice concerns as punitive damage awards. 2 58 Copyright
law requires that no statutory damage award be lower than $200 or higher
than $150,000.259 These limits "set forth in black and white" the potential
liability an individual faces for copyright infringement and provide clear
notice. 260 In defense of the statutory damage scheme, record labels and the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have advanced the argument that a
defendant has clear notice of the potential civil sanction he faces when he
commits an act of infringement. 26 1 They assert that "[b]ecause statutory
damages are, by definition, promulgated in a statute, persons held liable for
them cannot be deemed to have received inadequate notice." 26 2 This
notice, they argue, differentiates statutory damages from punitive damages
and removes the review of their constitutionality from the realm of the
Court's punitive damages jurisprudence. 263 Instead, the proper standard to
264
apply is that which is set forth in Williams.

256. Id. at 574-75; see also Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 60 (labeling notice
the "underlying concern" in Gore).
257. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 61 (discussing "[t]he due process
concerns present in the case of unlimited punitive damages").
258. Tepp, supra note 53, at 96 ("No serious contention can be made that there is a lack
of notice [with statutory damages].").
259. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
260. Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 61 ("[flnfringers have, at least, constructive
notice of the penalties that may imposed on them for their bad acts."); see also Accounting
Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc'ns, L.P., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809
(M.D. La. 2004) (holding that, with statutory damages, defendants in copyright infringement
suits cannot claim they did not have notice of the punishment).
261. See Opposition to Thomas-Rasset Motion, supra note 19, at 13-14 (remarking that
the statute provides notice); United States of America's Memorandum in Defense of the
Constitutionality of the Statutory Damages Provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c) at 7, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Cloud, No. 08-CV-01200 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25,
2009) [hereinafter U.S. Memorandum in Defense of the Statutory Damages Provision,
Cloud] (same).
262. U.S. Memorandum in Defense of the Statutory Damages Provision, Cloud, supra
note 261, at 7 (citing Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460
(D. Md. 2004)); see also DirecTV, Inc. v. Cantu, No. SA-04-CV-136-RF, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22715, at *13-15 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2004); Accounting Outsourcing,LLC, 329 F.
Supp. 2d at 809-10 (M.D. La. 2004).
263. See United States of America's Memorandum in Defense of the Constitutionality of
the Statutory Damages Provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) at 11, Capitol
Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-cv- 1497 (D. Minn. Aug. 14, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.
Memorandum in Defense of the Statutory Damages Provision, Thomas] (arguing that
because of the statutory range Gore is not applicable in a statutory damages context).
264. Id. at 10.
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b. Unchecked Discretion of the Court
Punitive damage awards run a substantial risk of offending due process
because juries are allowed wide latitude in fixing their amounts, which can
result in unfairness. 265 Leading up to the Gore decision, the Supreme Court
had expressed concern with the jury's discretion when setting a punitive
damage award. 266 In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 267 for
example, the Court expressed its concern that "unlimited jury discretionor unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive
damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional
sensibilities." 26 8 In Gore, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion discussed the
need for "reasonable constraints" when fixing damage awards. 2 69 He noted
that when there are limits on a court's discretion, including "legislative
enactments ... that classify awards and impose quantitative limits" on the
size of the verdict, then the verdict is entitled to "a strong presumption of
validity. '270 But when these restraints are lacking, the Constitution requires
a strict review of the damage award, like that which was undertaken in
27 1
Gore.
After the second Thomas-Rasset trial, the RIAA and the DOJ argued that
the range Congress created in the copyright statute is a sufficient check on
the discretion of courts awarding statutory damages. 272 Indeed, the
statutory damage provision places clear limits on the size of the awards, 2 73
which the Supreme Court has held act as constraints on the discretion of
courts assessing statutory damage awards. 274 Since the Gore decision,
courts have refused to apply the guideposts to statutory damage awards
based on these constraints. 27 5 As the court in Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg

265. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994); see also Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979) (discussing the impact of "unpredictable"
punitive damage awards).
266. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (noting that wide
discretion in setting awards had led to "punitive damages that 'run wild."'); see also Sykes,
supra note 167, at 1097-107 (tracing the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence
that led to Gore).
267. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
268. Id. at 18 (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)).
269. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586-87 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21) (discussing the Court's concerns with the discretion
allowed by the Alabama statute); see also McKee, supra 160, at 190-91 (discussing Justice
Breyer's concurrence); Sykes, supra note 167, at 1092-94 (same).
270. Gore, 517 U.S. at 586-87, 595 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993)).
271. Id. at 596.
272. See Opposition to Thomas-Rasset Motion, supra note 19, at 7; U.S. Memorandum in
Defense of the Statutory Damages Provision, Thomas, supra note 263, at 2.
273. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
274. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 (1952)
(holding that damage awards are fixed "within limited amounts").
275. See, e.g., Verizon Cal. Inc. v. OnlineNIC, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84235, at *22-23 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) (finding that Gore does not apply
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Mason, Inc.,2 76 reasoned, "The unregulated and arbitrary use of judicial
power that the Gore guideposts remedy is not implicated in Congress'
'2 77
carefully crafted and reasonably constrained [copyright] statute.
Through the lens of the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence, the fact
that a maximum and minimum constrain statutory damage awards is
significant. 2 78 These limits on jury discretion assure that statutory damage
awards for copyright infringement do not implicate the same constitutional
279
concerns as Gore and that the guideposts do not apply.
2. The Supreme Court's Tradition of Deference to Legislative Decisions
Regarding Copyright Law
When a legislature has set a penalty or sanction for wrongful conduct, the
Supreme Court generally gives great deference to that decision. 280 This
sentiment is best expressed by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.28 1 Justice O'Connor expressed the need for a reviewing court to
"accord 'substantial deference' to legislative judgments concerning
appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue." 282 This opinion ended up
being the basis of the creation of the third guidepost in Gore, which
requires the court to compare the punitive award to legislatively created
sanctions for similar misconduct and to give a great deal of deference to the
2 83
legislature's decisions.
It has been argued that Congress's decision to allow statutory damage
awards for copyright infringement is the type of legislative decision that
deserves deference from the reviewing court and that this deference
removes statutory damages from the scope of the Supreme Court's punitive

because there is no unchecked judicial discretion with statutory damage awards); Lowry's
Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460 (D. Md. 2004) (same).
276. 302 F. Supp. 2d 455 (D. Md. 2004).
277. Id. at 460 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991)).
278. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586-97 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (discussing the need for limits on the court's discretion when setting awards);
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20 ("As long as the discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints,
due process is satisfied." (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279 (1984); Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979); McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971))).
279. See Lowry's Reports, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 460; Tepp, supra note 53, at 96 (noting that
Gore should not be applied to statutory damages because the statute limits the court's
discretion).
280. See William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, ConstitutionalRegulation of Legislative
Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv.
373, 375-76 (1988); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
281. 492 U.S. 257.
282. Id. at 301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983)).
283. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583.
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damages jurisprudence. 284 The Constitution expressly grants Congress the
power to create laws governing copyright, 285 so the Supreme Court has
generally found that when it comes to legislative decisions regarding
copyright law, "[t]he wisdom of Congress' action . . . is not within [the
Court's] province to second-guess." 286 The Court specifically addressed
the issue of deference regarding the statutory damages range in Douglas v.
Cunningham.2 87 It held that because decisions about where to fix statutory
damage awards for copyright infringement involve the application of a
congressionally created "statutory yardstick," the resulting awards require
very deferential review.2 88 Statutory damage awards for copyright
infringement have always been reviewed under a standard that is
"extraordinarily deferential-even more so than in cases applying abuse-ofdiscretion review." 289 Thus, opponents of the Gore standard argue that this
tradition of deference to congressional acts regarding copyright law
indicates that the strict review outlined in Gore has no place in the review
of statutory damage awards for copyright infringement. 290 Even the Gore
decision itself emphasizes the importance of deferring to decisions of the
legislature about sanctions for misconduct. 29 1 Thus, the proper review for

284. Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims at 13, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Boggs,
No. 2:06-cv-00482 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Boggs Motion to Dismiss] ("[T]he
statutory damages provisions in the Copyright Act reflect a carefully considered and targeted
legislative judgment .

. .

. The wisdom of Congress' regime and the amounts set forth

therein is not within the province of [the Court] to second guess." (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003))); see also Tepp, supra note 53, at 97 (noting that the Gore Court
had no desire to substitute its judgment in place of the legislature, and that the guideposts are
designed to be applied in the absence of legislative decisions about appropriate sanctions).
285. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
286. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)
(stating "it is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve");
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (holding that
Congress has been granted the right to make decisions about copyright law).
287. 294 U.S. 207 (1935).
288. Id. at 210.
289. Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2007)
(citing Douglas, 294 U.S. at 210); see also Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase
Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the standard for
reviewing statutory damages awards is very deferential); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Star
Amusements, Inc., 44 F.3d 485, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio
21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that due process concerns with
statutory awards for copyright infringement require only "limited" review); Lowry's
Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (D. Md. 2004) (holding
Congress's decisions regarding copyright law are "entitled to substantial deference");
Colleen P. Murphy, JudicialAssessment of Legal Remedies, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 153, 202
(1999) ("No reported decision has reduced a litigated award that was within the appropriate
statutory range."); Thomas C. Welshonce, Record Companies Score Two Victories in One
Case Against Online Music Sharing, J. ALLEGHENY COUNTY B. ASS'N, Mar. 28, 2008, at 5,
available at http://www.acba.org/ACBA/pdf/TLJ/LJv1O-08-032808r.pdf
(noting the
Williams standard to be even more deferential than review for abuse of discretion).
290. See Tepp, supra note 53, at 96-97 (discussing how the Court's deferential treatment
of copyright law precludes the use of Gore in reviewing statutory damages).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
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statutory damages, they argue, is the highly deferential standard outlined in
Williams.
3. The Difficulties in Applying the Gore Guideposts to Statutory Damages
To argue that the Gore guideposts have no place in the review of
statutory damage awards for copyright infringement, two commentators
have attempted to apply the guideposts to statutory damages in order to
illustrate the poor, bordering on impossible, fit. 292 Applying the first
293
guidepost requires using the factors outlined in Gore and Campbell.
Steven M. Tepp found that some of the factors point to the conclusion that
the conduct of P2P network users like Jammie Thomas-Rasset and Joel
Tenenbaum is "reprehensible," and some do not. 294 Ben Sheffner came to a
similar conclusion, arguing that their conduct certainly was not innocent
within the meaning of the statute, but it also was not the most
blameworthy-the degree of reprehensibility of their conduct likely falls
somewhere in the middle. 295 Sheffner noted that deciding that P2P network
users fall in the middle of the scale does not help the inquiry, as the second
Thomas-Rasset jury set the damage award almost exactly in the middle of
296
the statutory range and the result was still a large award.
Tepp and Sheffner found the second and third guideposts to be an even
poorer fit than the first.297 The second guidepost requires comparing the

actual harm the plaintiff suffered to the size of the award. 298 But the
copyright statute allows a copyright owner to elect to receive statutory
damages in lieu of actual damages, so a comparison of a statutory award to
actual damages would contravene the very purpose of having statutory
damages in the first place. 299 The third guidepost requires a comparison of
the size of the statutory damage award to other criminal and civil sanctions
set by the legislature. 300 To both commentators, it was inapposite to
compare statutory damages to congressionally created civil sanctions for
30 1
similar actions, because they are congressionally created civil sanctions.
As Tepp noted, it is completely circular to compare a statutory damage
30 2
award to itself to determine its constitutional validity.
In August 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California in Verizon California Inc. v. OnlineNIC, Inc., undertook a
similar analysis of the applicability of the Gore guideposts to damages
awarded under a federal anticybersquatting law that used a statutory
292. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 61; Tepp, supra note 53, at 97.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
294. See Tepp, supra note 53, at 97.
295. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 56, 61.

296. See id. at 61.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

See id.; Tepp, supra note 53, at 97.
See supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
See Tepp, supra note 53, at 97.
See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 61; Tepp, supra note 53, at 97.
See Tepp, supra note 53, at 97.
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range. 30 3 The court found the task to be "problematic. '30 4 First, it found
that the majority of the factors used to determine reprehensibility were
irrelevant in the context of statutory damages. 30 5 Next, like Sheffner and
Tepp, the court found that the second guidepost was "out of place" since a
comparison to actual damages would run counter to the primary purpose of
statutory damage awards. 30 6 Finally, the court held that the third guidepost,
a comparison to other civil penalties, "rest[ed] almost entirely on the 'fair
notice' aspect of the due process limitations on damages awards. '307 Since
statutory damage awards "explicitly disclose[] the range of penalties that
may be awarded on a per-violation basis," there are no notice concerns, and
the third guidepost is inapplicable. 30 8 As commentators and the OnlineNIC
court have concluded, applying the Gore guideposts to statutory damages is
an "imperfect fit," 30 9 "awkward at best," 310 and "involves attempting to
pound the proverbial square peg into a round hole."'3 11 This is a clear
illustration that Williams should be applied to the review of statutory
damages, not Gore.3 12
III. WILLIAMS, NOT GORE, IS THE PROPER STANDARD FOR THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF STATUTORY DAMAGE AWARDS FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

After discussing each side of the debate over the proper standard of
review for statutory damages in Part II, Part III of this Note argues that the
guideposts that Gore created have no application in the constitutional
review of statutory damage awards for copyright infringement. Part III.A. 1
highlights the fact that notice was Gore's main due process concern, and
notice is not an issue with statutory damage awards. Part III.A.2 then
argues that the Gore Court's general concerns with excessiveness in
comparison to actual harm are equally inapplicable. Finally, Part III.A.3
contends that statutory damages for copyright infringement cannot be
arbitrary because they are set within the statutory range. This Note
concludes by arguing that the deferential review outlined in Williams is the
proper constitutional standard for statutory damages, and that in order to
provide a proper due process review courts must undertake a thorough
application of the test.

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84235 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009).
Id. at *23.
Id. at *23-24.
Id. at *24.
Id. at *25.
Id. at *25-26.
Id. at *26.
See Tepp, supra note 53, at 97.
See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 61.
See id.
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A. Gore Has No Place in the Review of Statutory Damages
Part III.A sets forth the reasons that this Note concludes the Gore
guideposts should not be applied to statutory damage awards for copyright
infringement. First, it contends that because statutory damage awards
provide notice, they do not implicate the main issue underlying the Gore
decision. Next, this part argues that the popular contention that statutory
damages are excessive compared to the harm infringement causes is
inaccurate and that such a comparison would undermine the main purpose
of statutory awards. Finally, this part argues that contrary to the claims of
many commentators, statutory damage awards for copyright infringement
are not arbitrary.
1. Statutory Damages Satisfy the Gore Court's Chief Concern
The Gore Court discussed a number of issues with punitive damages, but
notice was at the "heart" of the decision. 3 13 Not only were all of the other
concerns the Court expressed-such as arbitrariness, uncertainty, and
excessiveness-secondary, they were only an issue because of their effect
on notice. 3 14 The Court created each of the three guideposts to ensure
punitive damages awards provide notice as due process requires. 3 15 By
tying the award to "the accepted view that some wrongs are more
blameworthy than others" in the first guidepost, the Court provided notice
that the size of a punitive sanction would be related to the "enormity of
[the] offense." 3 16
The second guidepost-requiring a "reasonable
relationship" to the harm caused-is similarly based on long-standing
beliefs regarding how large punishments should be, and ensures the public
has notice that punishments will be comparable to the amount of damage
their actions cause. 3 17 Finally, the third guidepost looks to guarantee fair
notice by providing punitive damage awards that are comparable to
established legislatively created sanctions. 3 18 By ensuring that an award is
not arbitrary or excessive and complies with the three guideposts, the Gore

313. Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc'ns, L.P., 329 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 808-09 (M.D. La. 2004).
314. Because the public never would have expected an award so excessive, there was no
notice. See Lagrow, supra note 162, at 181 ("[T]he award went beyond constitutional limits
as BMW did not have fair notice that its nondisclosure policy would result in such a large
punitive award." (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584 (1996))). In his
concurring opinion, Justice Breyer also noted that awards decided arbitrarily fail to provide
proper notice. Gore, 517 U.S. at 587-88 (Breyer, J., concurring).
315. See Lagrow, supra note 162, at 194 (finding that the guideposts are used to
determine if a punitive award provided notice); Sykes, supra note 167, at 1090, 1108-09
(same).
316. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371
(1852)); supra text accompanying notes 168-70.
317. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 580-81, 583; supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
318. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 583-85; supra text accompanying notes 174-75; see also
Verizon Cal. Inc. v. OnlineNIC, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84235,
*25-26 (N.D. Cal Aug. 25, 2009) (discussing the third guidepost).
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decision corrects the constitutional notice problems that punitive damages
present.
Unlike punitive awards, statutory damages provide notice of the size of
the punishment for copyright infringement. There is little merit to the
argument that P2P network users, or anyone else that infringes a copyright,
3 19
are unaware of the liability they may face for their actions.
Commentators have argued that when multiple infringement claims are
aggregated, like in the RIAA's litigation campaign, the statutory range is no
longer an accurate barometer of the potential liability one faces for
infringement. 320 It is true that lawsuits aggregating multiple claims in a
single action may potentially lead to liability that is a great deal larger than
the maximum statutory award for a single infringement. 32 1 But it does not
follow that large suits and large damage awards do not provide notice. No
matter how many songs Jammie Thomas-Rasset, Joel Tenenbaum, and
every other P2P network user downloads or allows another user to
download from them, there is still constructive notice that they are subject
to potential liability of up to $150,000 for every single song. 322 Since
statutory damage awards for copyright infringement satisfy the chief
concern underlying the entire Gore decision, there is no reason the
guideposts should be used in a review of their constitutionality.
2. Arguments That Statutory Damages Are Excessive in Relation to Actual
Harm Are Inaccurate and Inapposite
The fact that statutory damages for copyright infringement provide an
infringer with notice of the size of the sanction they will face for their
actions likely removes them from the reach of the Gore guideposts. 323 But
even if the notice the copyright statute's damage provision provides was
insufficient to quiet the calls to apply Gore, there can still be no argument it
should be applied to determine if statutory damage awards are excessive in
relation to the amount of harm caused by infringement. The copyright
damage provision allows a copyright owner to recover statutory damages in
lieu of actual damages and profits. 324 Courts have consistently held that
when a copyright owner elects to receive statutory damages, there is no
is
requirement that they be reasonably related to actual damages. 325 This326
true with all statutory damages, not just with copyright infringement.
Since Williams, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutionality of a
statutory damage award is not to be judged by comparing it to the actual
319. See supra text accompanying notes 258-64.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
321. See supra text accompanying note 213.

322. See supra text accompanying notes 258-64.
323. See supra text accompanying note 314.
324. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
325. See infra text accompanying notes 326-32.

326. Williams, which serves as the constitutional standard of review for all statutory
damage awards, held that a statutory award does not need to be related to actual harm. See
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).
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injury suffered. 32 7 Copyright infringement causes damage to the copyright
owner that is difficult and costly to prove, 328 so courts do not require proof
of actual injury, 329 or even any injury at all when awarding statutory
damages. 330 To force a copyright owner to provide evidence of actual harm
in order to compare a statutory damage award to the injury suffered and to
determine if it was constitutionally excessive would undermine the purpose
for the creation of the statutory damage provision. 33 1332Such a comparison
has no place in the review of statutory damage awards.
Regardless of whether or not the comparison should even be made, the
argument that statutory damage awards are excessive when compared to
actual harm is fundamentally flawed. Most often this argument is based on
the premise that a P2P network user's infringement has harmed the
3 33
copyright owner to the tune of one lost sale for each song at issue at trial.
But, defendants in the RIAA's copyright infringement suits have not just
been sued for downloading songs instead of buying them-they have also
been sued for distributing songs illegally. 334 In addition, P2P network users
have actually downloaded and distributed hundreds, or even thousands,
more songs than they have been sued for. 335 In the most extreme sensc, the
actual damage a P2P network user has caused is not the lost revenue from
the sale of twenty or thirty songs on iTunes, but rather lost revenue from a
license for unlimited distribution for every single one of the hundreds or
thousands of songs he "shared. '33 6 At the very least, the actual damage
caused must be measured in terms of the countless sales that have been lost
327. Id. (holding that even though the statutory damage award at issue seemed excessive
when compared to the actual damage suffered, "its validity is not to be tested in that way").
328. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
329. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th
Cir. 1998) (noting that actual damages are difficult to prove, and holding that damages are
not required to be proven when awarding statutory damages); Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg
Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460-61 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that damages need not be
proven); see also Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2001)
(same); Columbia Pictures Television., Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259
F.3d 1186, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a comparison to actual damages is not
required); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488,
496 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); At. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53654, at *23-26 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008) (same).
330. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 92-100.
332. See Verizon Cal. Inc. v. OnlineNIC, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84235, at *22-23 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) (holding that because statutory damages
for copyright infringement do not need to be related to actual harm, Gore is not applicable).
333. See, e.g., Thomas-Rasset Motion for a New Trial, supra note 15, at 2; Amicus Brief
of Free Software Foundation, supra note 219, at 1-2 & n. 1;Samuelson & Wheatland, supra
note 48, at 458-59 nn.78-79; Barker, supra note 226, at 545-49; see also supra text
accompanying notes 226-30.
334. See, e.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (D. Minn.
2008) (noting that Thomas-Rasset was sued for downloading and distributing copyrighted
songs).
335. See supra text accompanying note 212.
336. See Opposition to Thomas-Rasset Motion, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that the
conduct of the defendant is generally the type that would require a license).
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because the defendants are allowing other users to download songs from
them. 337 It is "difficult, perhaps impossible" to track exactly how many
times a song was downloaded on a P2P network, and thus distributed, 33 8 but
the P2P network users the RIAA has targeted placed songs in a folder that
could have been accessed by any one of the seventy million people who
were using P2P networks at the time the lawsuit program began. 339 To
assert that each song an individual downloader infringes damages the record
labels to the tune of a lost sale on iTunes is simply inaccurate, as the harm
caused by a P2P network user's downloading and distribution of such songs
340
is actually far greater.
3. Unlike Punitive Damages, Statutory Damage Awards for Copyright
Infringement Are Not at Risk of Being Arbitrary
Like the excessiveness issue, the fact that statutory damages provide
proper notice likely renders the argument that Gore should be applied to
statutory damages because they are arbitrary moot.3 41 But even if that is
not the case, there is still no concern that statutory damages are arbitrary.
As Justice Breyer discussed in Gore, punitive damages are arbitrary
because of the lack of "legal standards that provide 'reasonable constraints'
within which 'discretion is exercised."'' 342 But, unlike punitive damages,
copyright's statutory damage provision has been held to provide constraints
on the discretion of the court. 343 There is a substantial difference between a
punitive award, which can often be the result of "a decisionmaker's
caprice," 344 and a damage award that results from a statutory range, created
with a great deal of Congress's time, thought, and effort, that limits the
discretion of courts setting damage awards for copyright infringement. 345
The limits placed on the court's discretion ensure that statutory damages are
not similar to punitive awards, as they are not set at some arbitrary amount
and do not deprive copyright infringers of due process. 34 6 In fact, none of
337. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 60 (finding that focusing on only the
original download and not the subsequent distribution is a "flawed" conception of actual
harm caused).
338. Id. (discussing the lack of any records when P2P network users download songs).
339. See Ray Delgado, Law Professors Examine Ethical Controversies of Peer-to-Peer
File Sharing, STANFORD REP., Mar. 17, 2004, http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2004/
march 17/fileshare-317.html.

340. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 14, at 60.
341. See supra text accompanying note 314.

342. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1991)); see also supra text
accompanying notes 269-71.
343. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 (1952) (holding
that a court's discretion when awarding statutory damages is "exercise[d] ...within limited
amounts"); see also supra text accompanying notes 272-79.
344. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001)
(citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 587).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73, 110-17.
346. Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460 (D. Md. 2004)
("The unregulated and arbitrary use ofjudicial power that the Gore guideposts remedy is not
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the major constitutional concerns with punitive damage awards that the
Supreme Court articulated in Gore are present with statutory damages for
copyright infringement. The inevitable conclusion is that Gore and the
guideposts it created have no application in the review of a statutory
damage award.
B. Due ProcessRequires a More Thorough Review Under the Williams
Standard
When a court reviews the constitutionality of a statutory damage award,
the proper standard to use is outlined in Williams. The guideposts outlined
in Gore are designed to be a check on a number of important constitutional
issues; but the statutory damage provision simply does not implicate the
same concerns. 347 A number of courts have suggested in dicta that the
Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence may have some relevance
to statutory damages. 34 8 However, in each of those decisions, the lower
courts (1) were ruling on class action certification, 349 (2) refused to rule on
whether Gore or Williams was the proper standard, 350 or (3) actually
applied Williams in the end. 35 1 While courts have consistently applied the
Williams standard to statutory damages, 352 Gore has never been applied to
review and overtum a statutory award. 353 Thus, the exacting review that
has become a staple of the Supreme Court's punitive damages
jurisprudence has no relevance in the review of a statutory damage award.
Instead, statutory damages for copyright infringement are constitutional
unless "the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly
354
disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable."

implicated in Congress' carefully crafted and reasonably constrained statute." (citing Haslip,
499 U.S. at 20)).
347. See supra Parts II.B, III.A.
348. See, e.g., Zomba Enters. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir.
2007); Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003); Verizon Cal. Inc.
v. OnlineNIC, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84235, at *25-26 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 25, 2009); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. C 04-1671 MHP, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11498, at *37-39 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Gonzalez, No.
SA-03-CV-1 170 XR, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16734, at *12-14 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2004).
349. See, e.g., Parker,331 F.3d at 15; In re Napster,2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11498, at *5.
350. See, e.g., In re Napster, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11498, at *40-42; Gonzalez, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16734, at *13.
351. See, e.g., Zomba, 491 F.3d at 586-88; OnlineNIC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84235, at
*20-26.
352. See, e.g., Zomba, 491 F.3d at 586-88; United States v. Citrin, 972 F.2d 1044, 1051
(9th Cir. 1992); OnlineNIC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84235, at *20; Centerline Equip. Corp.
v. Banner Pers. Serv., 545 F. Supp. 2d 768, 777-78 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v.
Bundy-Howard, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 905, 914-15 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Texas v. Am. Blastfax,
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090-91 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962
F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
353. See Zomba, 491 F.3d at 587; Tepp, supra note 53, at 93 (noting that "no court has
ever accepted [the] argument" that Gore applies to statutory damages).
354. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919).
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The conclusion that the Williams standard should be used to review
statutory damage awards for copyright infringement means that all statutory
damage awards likely satisfy due process. Unlike punitive damages, which
are set by an unsophisticated jury, Congress has set limits on statutory
damage awards. 355 Because of this, the Supreme Court's constitutional
review for statutory damages is extremely deferential to Congress's
decisions. 356 The Williams standard is so deferential, and sets the bar so
low for satisfying due process, that no court has ever used it to invalidate an
award of statutory damages. 357 The way Williams is currently applied to
review statutory damage awards for copyright infringement, there is no
reason to believe that this trend will not continue.
Settling on the Williams standard as the proper level of constitutional
review for statutory damages does not end the discussion. The current
statutory damage provision has the potential to result in extremely large
awards, 358 and these large awards are the cause of a number of worrisome
issues. For example, there is a real concern that the statutory damage
provision as constructed has the potential to overcompensate and
overdeter. 359 It is true that Congress adjusted the statutory range only ten
years ago in order to combat exactly the type of conduct P2P network users
are accused of.360 However, it is hard to argue that awards that range from
hundreds of thousands of dollars to multimillion dollar damage awards are
not substantially more than what is necessary to deter defendant P2P
network users, as well as the general public, from future copyright
infringement and to adequately compensate the plaintiff record labels for
36 1
their injury.
There is also a legitimate worry that statutory damages have strayed from
their traditional purposes. The goals of copyright damages have always
been to compensate copyright owners for their injuries and deter future acts
of copyright infringement. 362 But recently, numerous courts, including the
Supreme Court, have stated that an important purpose of statutory damages
is to punish the infringer. 363
In addition, plaintiffs in copyright
355. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (c) (2006).
356. See supra Part II.B.2.
357. See supra text accompanying note 289.
358. See, e.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227-28 (D. Minn.
2008) (awarding $222,000 in statutory damages); Memorandum of Law & Order, supra note
10, at 5 (awarding $1.92 million in statutory damages); Judgment, supra note 12, at 1
(awarding $675,000 in statutory damages).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 222-25.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17.
361. Judge Davis, for example, believed that the damage award in the first ThomasRasset trial, which was substantially smaller than the award in the second trial, as well as in
the Tenenbaum trial, was far too large considering the offense committed. See Thomas, 579
F. Supp. 2d at 1227 (noting the judgment was "more than five hundred times the cost of
buying 24 separate CDs and more thanfour thousandtimes the cost of three CDs").
362. See supra text accompanying notes 92-106, 243-46.
363. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352-53
(1998); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001); Cass County Music
Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996).
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infringement suits have plainly admitted the belief that statutory damages
punish. 364 Punishment may be an important function of the statutory
damage provision, especially as a means of providing deterrence. 365 But
because it has never been Congress's express goal, it is especially important
to keep statutory damage awards from overpunishing copyright infringers
and violating due process.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a great deal of
apprehension regarding the statutory damage awards that result when
numerous infringement claims are aggregated. The aggregation of multiple
366
statutory damage awards leads to uncertainty over the size of the award,
greater concerns of overcompensation and deterrence, 367 and generally
larger awards. As technological advances are made and it becomes easier
and more efficient to investigate and prove digital copyright infringement,
there exists the potential for lawsuits involving thousands of claims of
infringement and statutory damage awards near the $150,000 maximum
368
multiplied thousands of times over.
These concerns with large statutory damage awards have resulted in calls
to apply the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence to the review
of statutory awards 369 or even to amend the current statute. 370 But such
drastic changes to the system of assessing copyright damages are
unnecessary. Courts should instead apply a more rigorous constitutional
review under the Williams standard and truly consider the possibility that
these large statutory damage awards may fail that test. While Williams is a
deferential standard, courts have potentially been too deferential in applying
it. In Tenenbaum, for example, Judge Gertner called the $675,000 award
"astronomical" and discussed the "injustice" of allowing such large damage
awards against students and teenagers. 37 1 And in Thomas-Rasset, Judge
Davis emphatically stated after the first trial that the statutory damages
awarded were completely out of proportion to the offense committed 37 2 and
called the second verdict "monstrous and shocking" and "unjust" when
364. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Denise Cloud's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 16, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Cloud,
No. 2:08 CV 01200 WY (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2008); Boggs Motion to Dismiss, supra note
284, at 13.
365. See supra text accompanying note 248.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 231-41.
368. See Barker, supra note 226, at 554 (discussing "the aggregation of such awards over
many hundreds or thousands of instances of misconduct" (citing Frank Ahrens, Music
Industry Will Talk Before Suing, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2003, at El)).
369. See, e.g., id. at 536-54 (discussing why Gore should apply to statutory damages for
copyright infringement); Evanson, supra note 14, at 617-37 (discussing the application of
Gore to statutory damages generally).
370. See, e.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn.
2008) (same); Memorandum and Order, supra note 149, at 34-35 (calling for the statute to
be amended); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 497-510 (outlining proposals for
reform).
371. Memorandum and Order, supra note 149, at 34-35.
372. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227; see also supra text accompanying note 361.
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ordering remittitur for the $1.92 million award. 373 Yet none of these
awards were found to fail the Williams test. This is not to say that these
awards definitively violate due process, but these comments would seem to
indicate that they do. If courts are so deferential when reviewing the
constitutionality of a statutory damage award under Williams that no award
is ever overturned, it is the functional equivalent of not providing any due
process review. In order to ensure that statutory damage awards for
copyright infringement are constitutional, courts must review the awards
with an eye towards the plain language of the Williams test-when a
statutory damage award is "severe and oppressive," "wholly
disproportioned,"3 74and "obviously unreasonable," it should be found to be
unconstitutional.
As important as it is for courts to provide a true due process review under
Williams, determining if a statutory damage award is constitutional is
unfortunately not as simple as a straightforward application of the test.
Large statutory damage awards for copyright infringement present a
difficult constitutional issue, and the court must have regard for a number of
important considerations before reducing or reversing an award. First and
most importantly, the court must remember that the review is not the same
as the review outlined in Gore.375 The actual harm caused by infringement
may be an important guide when decreasing the award to ensure its
constitutionality, but courts should not look to some ratio between actual
damages and statutory damages. 376 There is no requirement that a plaintiff
prove his actual damages suffered and no requirement that the statutory
award be reasonably related to actual damages. 37 7 So, while courts should
look to evidence of actual injury if it exists to provide guidance when
determining if an award is constitutional, it cannot control the inquiry.
It is also necessary for courts to be cognizant of the fact that defendants
in copyright infringement suits have often caused a great deal more harm
than the handful of actual infringements at issue. In the suits brought by the
record labels against P2P network users, most of the defendants have
378
actually infringed the copyrights of hundreds, if not thousands, of songs.
While courts cannot truly penalize the defendant for conduct he has not
been sued for, they must be aware of the fact that reducing an award based
on the infringements at issue does not truly compensate the plaintiffs for
their injury. Such a decision also has an impact on future infringement
suits. 379 Record labels have focused on only a limited number of songs at
373. Memorandum of Law & Order, supra note 10, at 3, 17.
374. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919).
375. See discussion supra Part III.A.
376. See supra text accompanying note 79; see also Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc., 638 F.
Supp. 983, 987 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("[W]hether and to what extent a plaintiff has been harmed
by a defendant's infringement" is relevant to the statutory award.).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 324-32.
378. See supra note 212.
379. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order, supra note 149, at 2 (noting that the court was
"deeply concerned by the rash of file-sharing lawsuits").
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trial because of the difficulties of proving infringement, as well as
ownership, of the copyrights. 380 Reducing damage awards to the optimal
level of compensation and deterrence based on only the accused infringing
acts would require copyright holders to litigate more claims and larger cases
in the future to ensure adequate compensation for their actual injuries. This
copyright
would lead to an inefficient use of the resources of the court, the 38
1 It is
holder, and the infringer required to litigate the difficult suit.
important that courts take into consideration concerns with judicial
economy, as well as the time and expense involved in investigating,
proving, and defending large copyright suits when deciding whether or not
to reduce a statutory damage award.
In the examination of the constitutionality of a statutory damage award,
courts should also consider the defendant's conduct. 382 There is a
widespread belief that digital copyright infringement is somehow less
wrong simply because it is extremely prevalent. 383 But, the conduct of P2P
network users is the equivalent of stealing hundreds of CDs, adding them to
the users' own record collection, and allowing anyone who desires to make
their own copy of any of the songs. 38 4 This is extremely harmful behavior
that has, in the aggregate, resulted in multibillion dollar losses for the
recording industry, hundreds of millions of dollars in lost tax revenue, and
tens of thousands of lost jobs every single year. 385 Courts reviewing
statutory damage awards must remember just how serious copyright
infringement is.
Courts should also consider the effect the conduct of the defendant
during the trial process may have had on the jury's verdict. The actions of
Jammie Thomas-Rasset and Joel Tenenbaum are perfect examples of the
type of conduct that is likely to result in a higher jury verdict. ThomasRasset continues to deny she used P2P services despite the mountain of
evidence against her, and even claimed on the witness stand that she had
never heard of Kazaa despite the fact that the program was found on her
hard drive and she wrote a paper on Napster in college. 38 6 Joel Tenenbaum

380. See supra text accompanying notes 94-100.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
382. See supra text accompanying note 80.
383. See, e.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227-28 (D. Minn.
2008) ("Unfortunately, by using Kazaa, Thomas acted like countless other Internet users. Her
alleged acts were illegal, but common."); Defendant's Opposition, supra note 231, at 4-7 ("To
members of the born-digital generation, . . . sharing music on the Internet is as commonplace
and innocuous as driving 60 in a 55 mph zone .... ).
384. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 961 (2005) (Breyer, J.,

concurring) ("[D]eliberate unlawful copying is no less an unlawful taking of property than
garden-variety theft.").
Online and on the Street, http://www.riaa.com/
385. See RIAA, Piracy:
physicalpiracy.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); see also supra text accompanying note 113.

386. See Opposition to Thomas-Rasset Motion, supra note 19, at 4; Nate Anderson,
Jammie Thomas Takes the Stand, Admits to Major Misstep, ARs TECHNICA, June 16, 2009,

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/jammie-thomas-takes-the-stand-admitsto-major-misstep.ars.
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continued illegally downloading music even after he was sued by the record
labels, admitted on the witness stand to lying in written discovery responses
and during a deposition, 387 and his attorney aggravated the judge and
confused the jury. 38 8 There is a strong likelihood that both juries took these
actions into account when fixing the statutory awards, so it is important that
the judges reviewing the awards do not disregard them.
Finally, courts must accord deference to Congress's authority to set the
statutory range. 389 When the statutory range was created, Congress took
years to make sure they set the range so that it would adequately
compensate copyright holders at a level similar to actual damages.3 90 In
1999, Congress recognized the benefits to copyright owners and the public
in general that result from combating infringement, and increased the range
to its current levels in order to provide adequate compensation and
deterrence in the face of the exact type of conduct at issue in the RIAA's
lawsuits. 39 1 But even with Congress's higher statutory range, digital
copyright infringement continues to increase. 392 It is extremely important
that any court that aims to reduce a large statutory damage award is sure
that the new award provides the substantial compensation and deterrence
that Congress has recognized is necessary.
Providing the proper due process review of statutory damages for
copyright infringement requires courts to strike a delicate balance. Because
statutory damages are set within a congressionally created range, they are
simply not the same as punitive damages and should not be reviewed under
the same constitutional standard. They should be reviewed with deference
to the legislature's decision regarding where to set the statutory range under
Williams-a standard which will generally lead to awards being found
constitutional. But, courts reviewing statutory awards must balance the
need to be deferential with the need to provide a true due process review.
They must be cognizant of the aforementioned concerns with large statutory
damages. This requires courts to follow the plain language of the test
outlined in Williams and find any awards that violate it to be
unconstitutional. On top of that, courts must be aware of the far-reaching
impact their review of a damage award may have. Before making any
decision on the constitutionality of a statutory damage award they must
consider the concerns with reducing or overturning awards discussed

387. See Sheffner, supra note 150.
388. See supra text accompanying note 149.
389. See supra Part I.B.2.

390. See supra text accompanying note 68.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 107-17.
392. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 3, at 9-10 (noting that, since the RIAA
began suing P2P downloading services and individuals who use them, P2P file-sharing has
continued to increase every year). In the most stunning example of how little deterrence the
current statutory damages provision may actually provide, Joel Tenenbaum continued to
download and share music illegally after he received a warning letter from the record labels
and even after he was sued for copyright infringement in 2007. See Sheffner, supra note 150.
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above.39 3 While this is certainly a difficult balance for courts to achieve,
when they do, they have provided proper due process review for statutory
damages in copyright infringement lawsuits.

393. See supra text accompanying notes 375-92.
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